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AND THE IDEA OF GOD

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MORAL VALUES
AND THE IDEA OF GOD

THE GIFFORD LECTURES
DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
ABERDEEN IN 1914 AND 1915

BY

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TO THE MEMORY OF

CHARLES HAMILTON SORLEY

ONE OF MANY THOUSANDS WHO GAVE
THEIR LIVES FREELY IN A GREAT CAUSE

For they sought a country.

"*Make Beauty and make Rest give place,*
Mock Prudence loud—and she is gone,
Smite Satisfaction on the face,
And tread the ghost of Ease upon.
Light-lipped and singing press we hard
Over old earth which now is worn,
Triumphant, buffeted and scarred,
By billows howled at, tempest-torn,
Toward blue horizons far away."

THE GIFFORD TRUST

"*I Having been for many years deeply and firmly convinced that the true knowledge of God, that is, of the Being, Nature, and Attributes of the Infinite, of the All, of the First and the Only Cause, that is, the One and Only Substance and Being, and the true and felt knowledge (not mere nominal knowledge) of the relations of man and of the universe to Him, and of the true foundations of all ethics and morals, being, I say, convinced that this knowledge, when really felt and acted on, is the means of man's highest well-being, and the security of his upward progress, I have resolved, from the 'residue' of my estate as aforesaid, to institute and found, in connection, if possible, with the Scottish Universities, lectureships or classes for the promotion of the study of said subjects, and for the teaching and diffusion of sound views regarding them....*

"*The lecturers appointed shall be subjected to no test of any kind, and shall not be required to take any oath, or to emit or subscribe any declaration of belief, or to make any promise of any kind; they may be of any denomination whatever, or of no denomination at all (and many earnest and high-minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical denomination); they may be of any religion or way of thinking, or as is sometimes said, they may be of no religion, or they may be so-called sceptics or agnostics or freethinkers, provided only that the 'patrons' will use diligence to secure that they be able reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth....*

"*I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense,*

the only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation.... The lecturers shall be under no restraint whatever in their treatment of their theme....

"*The lectures shall be public and popular, that is, open not only to students of the Universities, but to the whole community without matriculation, as I think that the subject should be studied and known by all, whether receiving University instruction or not. I think such knowledge, if real, lies at the root of all well-being....*

"*And my desire and hope is that these lectureships and lectures may promote and advance among all classes of the community the true knowledge of Him Who is, and there is none and nothing besides Him, in Whom we live and move and have our being, and in Whom all things consist, and of man's real relationship to Him Whom truly to know is life everlasting.*" (From Lord Gifford's Will, dated 21 August, 1885.)

PREFACE

I HAVE quoted some sentences from the remarkable document which instituted the Gifford Lectureships, for it contains matter of permanent interest. Lord Gifford was deeply convinced that the knowledge which he sought to promote was of importance for human well-being; he wished to make it accessible to those outside, as well as to those within, academic circles; he had confidence in reason and left his lecturers free to follow whithersoever the argument might lead; and he himself gave a description of the kind of knowledge which he had in view. In this description he coupled "the true foundations of all ethics and morals" with "the true knowledge of God." The present work is concerned with the relation between these two topics. The point of view from which that relation is regarded is not the most common one; but neither is it by any means novel. Many philosophers have held that ethical ideas have a bearing on the view of the universe which we are justified in forming, and they have allowed their thinking to be influenced by these ideas. Since Kant proclaimed the primacy of the practical reason in a certain regard, this point of view has been adopted by thinkers of different schools, and reasons have been urged in its support.

But a systematic investigation of the validity of the procedure is still lacking. We must ask, What is the justification for using ethical ideas, or other ideas of value, in philosophical construction? In what way, if at all, can they be used legitimately? And what effect have they upon our final view of the world? A systematic investigation of these questions has been attempted in the present volume.

The lectures of which the book consists were delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the summer terms of 1914 and 1915. Although nearly a year elapsed between the tenth lecture and the eleventh, the whole is intended to be a continuous argument. In carrying out this argument, no attempt has been made to give a critical survey of contemporary thinking on the topics which arise for discussion. To have done so would have been to extend unduly the length of the book. And a survey of this kind has now been rendered unnecessary by the work of my friend and predecessor in the Gifford Lectureship, Professor Pringle-Pattison. Through criticism of recent philosophy he has elicited a view akin to that which I have reached in another way. Both the similarity and the difference are indicated by the title of my book.

A few days before my appointment to the Gifford Lectureship, I was honoured with an invitation to give a course of Hibbert Lectures on Metaphysics at Manchester College, Oxford. These lectures were delivered

in the winter of 1913–14, and for them the greater portion of the material now published was first drafted. This material was revised and enlarged before it was given at Aberdeen; and the whole has been again revised, with additions in some places and omissions in others, in preparation for the press. In present circumstances it is perhaps unnecessary to apologise for the delay in its appearance.

My obligations to other writers—not least to those from whom I differ—are too numerous to mention, and they are inadequately acknowledged in footnotes. In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the Senatus of the University of Aberdeen for re-calling me to the University as a Gifford Lecturer. To many old friends in Aberdeen, and especially to Dr Davidson and Dr Baillie, the professors of philosophy, my thanks are due for much kindness and encouragement.

W. R. S.

August 1918.

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I

THE PROBLEM

THE purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole which we are justified in forming. (The argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God.) In this way it reverses the traditional order of procedure which seeks first for an interpretation of reality, founded upon scientific generalisations or upon the conceptions involved in knowledge, and then goes on to draw out the ethical consequences of the view that has been reached. This traditional method has some advantage on the ground of simplicity. It concerns itself at first solely with what is and does not allow itself to be disturbed by the intrusion of the alien conception of value or of what ought to be. It is true also that the idea a man forms of the nature of things as a whole can hardly fail to affect his view as to what is of highest worth and thus lead on to ethical consequences. But, for this very reason, it is necessary that the basis of our theory of reality should be as broad and complete as possible; and it will lack breadth and completeness if moral facts and ideas have been excluded at the outset. The facts of morality as they appear in the world, and the ideas of good and evil found in man's consciousness, are among the data of experience. If we

overlook them in constructing our theory of reality, we do so at the risk of leaving out something that is required for a view of the whole, and we shall probably find that our base is too narrow for the structure we build upon it. On this account it is desirable to fix attention on certain data which it has been customary to disregard in forming a philosophical theory and to enquire how far these data have a contribution to make towards determining our ultimate view of reality.

This way of approach is not altogether new. The impulse towards philosophy has often come from morality or religion rather than from science. In Plato's *Republic*, for instance, the argument rests upon an examination of ethical conceptions and terminates in the idea of the Good as the source of all reality and power. In most systems of philosophy, however, ethical enquiry has been postponed until the fundamental conceptions of reality have been fully elaborated; and, even where this is not the case, ethical ideas have not been worked methodically into the structure of the system, but have remained suggestions merely or influences which in some degree modified its general character. There was novelty, therefore, in Kant's assertion of the primacy of the practical reason in dealing with the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. But his view was founded on a contrast between the speculative and the practical reason, which left the former free, or rather compelled, to disregard the data of moral experience as something which lay outside the range of its application, and made the practical reason simply its supplement and corrective. This characteristic has persisted with most of the thinkers who have been influenced by Kant's demand

for a view of reality which will satisfy the moral consciousness. They have recognised ethical ideas as providing an additional test of the adequacy of a view of the world, not as forming an essential portion of the data from which such a view should be derived. Perhaps this holds even of Lotze, though, in a remarkable passage, he has formulated a doctrine which proclaims a complete break with the traditional method.

In the concluding section of his treatise on *Metaphysic*—the last book which he lived to write—Lotze repeats a dictum with which he had closed his first book—a book which bears the same title as his latest. "The true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics," he asserts. "I admit," he goes on to say, "that the expression is not exact; but I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which *should be* the ground of that which *is*." The reflexions on the world and human life contained in his *Mikrokosmus* show the importance of this thought for Lotze's philosophy. They give some indication, also, of the way in which ideas of worth or value, and, in particular, ethical ideas may be used in interpreting the world, and of the relations of this mode of interpretation to the account of the connexion of things arrived at by means of scientific conceptions. But he never worked out the system of ethical metaphysics which he adumbrated. He looked forward to a future occasion to justify his view against objections; but for this justification opportunity was denied him.

His expression of opinion has thus come down to us in questionable shape. It has all the impressiveness that belongs to a belief that, from first to last, informed the

thinking of a philosopher who was careful to respect and carry out the methods and results of science. But it has not been worked into his system, and his words remain the record of a personal belief whose logical position is uncertain. We may be tempted to ask whether we are to take them for nothing more than this—an expression of the author's individuality, which we may accept or reject as our subjective preferences dictate? If this were all, it would be useless to pursue the matter further. Yet Lotze himself sometimes encourages us to take this view; and the connexion in which the dictum makes its appearance raises a question. His argument is over when he says that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics; and it was not from ethics that his own beginning was made. He began with the difficulties and contradictions that confront the thinker when he tries to understand the connexion of things; and he overcame these difficulties by postulating an inner substantial unity of all reality which solves the contradiction of transeunt causation. It is only at the end of his work that he throws out the suggestion that the secret of reality can be revealed only by the ethical 'ought,' and that this should form the starting-point of a metaphysical enquiry.

The terms in which the dictum is stated seem precise enough; but they do not pretend to be exact; and, as Lotze himself has not worked out the doctrine, it is unnecessary to lay stress on his form of statement. The view which he indicates is opposed to the prevailing opinion of philosophers, but yet it is sufficiently familiar at the present day. It is, in short, this: that ethical ideas, or, more generally, ideas about value or worth, have a certain primacy for, or at least have an important and

legitimate bearing upon, the interpretation of reality. This is the postulate expressed in its most general terms; but, as thus expressed, it might be used, and has been used, to cover various meanings.

One possible meaning may be mentioned, in the first place, which might be accepted without entailing any modification of the traditional data or method of philosophy. The function of ethical ideas in interpreting reality may be very real and important; but it may be in place only after some general view of the nature of the world has been established. It is a consequence of theism, for instance, that the cosmic process is regarded as expressing a divine and therefore good purpose, so that, in the further interpretation of that process, ethical ideas have a legitimate and necessary function. But the function of ethical ideas is, in this case, secondary and consequential: their place and use depend on the prior establishment of theism—to be more precise, of an ethical theism. It would be incorrect to assert that this was all that Lotze meant by his dictum, though it is a view which is definitely suggested by the line of argument in the *Metaphysic*. But it was not his full meaning; and, if it had been, it would not have been of great significance. It does not put ethics at the beginning of metaphysics; it would not require to be promulgated as marking a divergence from traditional methods; and it would ignore all the difficulties which arise in attempting to establish an ethical theism without a previous enquiry into ethical facts and principles. It is simply to distinguish it from other and more important meanings of the same general statement that this possible meaning of it has to be referred to at all.

The principle, if it is to be significant of a type of philosophy, must mean that ethical ideas are not merely of importance in philosophical construction, but that they have a place at the basis of the structure—that our metaphysics must be founded on ethics, that in our idea of the 'ought' we are to discover at least a guide to a true idea of the 'is.'

This principle has sometimes been taken as implying or justifying what may be called a subjective ground for determining the nature of objective reality. Here, accordingly, we may distinguish a second meaning which has been put upon the dictum. Ethical ideas have a direct bearing upon practice. What we say ought to be becomes for us a demand that it shall be; it is potentially an object of desire and determines our wishes and conduct. In this way the whole inner world not of obligation only but also of desire and wish combines to make a demand upon reality; and no view of reality is accepted as one in which the whole consciousness can find rest unless it commend itself by satisfying this practical need as well as the demands of the reason. On this ground, it is sometimes held, reality must be not merely what we find it to be, or what our reason convinces us that it is, but also what we need or wish or very earnestly desire that it shall be. "Things," says William James[1], "reveal themselves soonest to those who most passionately want them." The statement is true, and he has also given the true reason for it: "for our need sharpens our wit." Things are not what they are because we want them so to be; but they are revealed to the man who has wit to discover them, and his wit

[1] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 176.

is often sharpened by his need to know. To go further than this, and to say that reality must satisfy our wants, is to assume beforehand a whole view of the world and of its adaptation to human emotion and desire. It would be to beg the questions which we are setting out to discuss, and it would be to take the less stable factors in human nature as the standard of truth.

It is therefore important to point out that the dictum that ethics lies at the basis of metaphysics may be interpreted in a third way, which avoids the apparent subjectivity which attaches to the meaning just mentioned. It may be held that our final view of reality must be based upon experience; that this experience must be taken in its whole range, and must not be arbitrarily limited to the data of perception which intelligence works up into science; that the appreciation of moral worth, or of value generally, is as true and immediate a part of our experience as the judgments of perception; and that it, as well as they, forms a part of the data of metaphysics. Further, it may be contended that, just as the data of sense-experience are found to manifest certain regularities from which 'laws of nature,' as they are called, may be inferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law or order can be discovered, with a claim to be regarded as objective, which may be compared with the similar claim made on behalf of natural law. If we take experience as a whole, and do not arbitrarily restrict ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical and natural sciences have to do, then our interpretation of it must have ethical data at its basis and ethical laws in its structure. It is the

validity and consequences of this view that I propose to discuss.

Before entering upon this enquiry it may be well to clear the way by a short review of the types of thought to which it is opposed and from which, historically, it is a re-action. Kant's doctrine has led to a number of views which differ from one another in detail and even in fundamental points. But all of them might be described, in his phrase, as asserting and depending upon the primacy, or at least fundamental importance, of the practical reason. In this respect they may be contrasted with the prevalent or orthodox tradition of most philosophical schools. These have attributed primacy to the theoretical reason, and to the practical reason they have assigned a secondary and subsidiary place. In general, the question of the relation of the practical to the theoretical reason has not been discussed. It has been assumed, as something too obvious for defence or even for statement, that we have first to find out the true nature of things, and that the rule and end for conduct and the meaning of value will then be plain. Reason is one, and the theory of reality is expected at the same time to be, or easily to lead to, a theory of goodness. This assumption is not peculiar to one school of philosophy, but is shared by various schools, though each may have a different way of putting the matter. What is common to them all is that an enquiry, which, in data as well as method, is purely theoretical, leads—somehow or other—to ethical results. In this way the ethical principles of Rationalism, of Idealism, and of Naturalism are often arrived at.

At a certain point these theories all pass from propositions about reality or what 'is' to propositions about goodness or what 'ought to be.' They make a transition to a new predicate; and the difficulty for them lies in justifying this transition. This is the crucial question for the whole class of theories which found their ethical doctrines upon a metaphysics which, at the start and up to a certain point, was not ethical. We may describe these systems generally as systems of metaphysical ethics; and, in seeking to understand them, we have to put the question, how do they pass from being to goodness, from 'is' to 'ought'? The question is not altogether easy to answer, just because as a rule they do not recognise the difficulty of making the transition and even ignore that a transition to a new order of conceptions is being made. But I think that two methods may be distinguished, by which the transition has actually been made or attempted. On one of these methods ethics is regarded as simply an application of theoretical or metaphysical principles to a new material—to the material of conduct or of conscious volition. The relation of ethics to metaphysics is, on this view, similar to the relation of mechanics to mathematics. Mechanics deals with the application of mathematical laws or formulæ to masses and molecules, and in the same way ethics applies metaphysical truths to conduct or volition. Reason is held to become practical by virtue of its new subject-matter, that is to say, by being applied to practice or conduct: the principles remain the same; only the application is different. This is one kind of metaphysical ethics; and it is that which characterises a Rationalist or Intellectualist school of thought, such as Cartesianism. But

a similar method is also frequently adopted by the exponents of that form of scientific philosophy called Naturalism. Another way of proceeding from theoretical to ethical conceptions may be traced in Idealisms of the Hegelian type or approximating to that type. According to this method we pass from the non-ethical to ethical conceptions by criticism of the former. This criticism, it is held, brings out a meaning which is really implicit in the conceptions with which we started, though it was not at first seen to be there. The dialectic of the notion compels us to advance from the relatively abstract stage in which no ethical content was apparent to the more concrete stage in which an ethical meaning becomes explicit. It is important to understand how these two methods work, and how they deal with the special difficulties which they encounter. They must therefore be considered separately.

1. The most characteristic of all systems of Rationalism is that of Descartes and his followers. According to him knowledge is one, and its method is always the same. "All knowledge," he says, "is of the same nature throughout, and consists solely in combining what is self-evident[1]." The type to which every kind of knowledge must conform, if it is to be truly knowledge, is, in his opinion, mathematical demonstration. In mathematics we start with self-evident propositions and pass from one proposition to another by means of a chain of reasoning, each link in which is clearly a true proposition. The chain cannot be endless; that is why a special class of self-evident propositions is needed at the outset.

[1] *Regulæ ad directionem ingenii*, xii; *Philosophical Works*, transl. Haldane and Ross, vol. 1, p. 47.

All our ordinary scientific or philosophical propositions depend ultimately upon some primary proposition or propositions, assumed as self-evident; but each step which connects the later proposition with the earlier must also be equally evident. We accept the proposition p because it is evident that it follows from q; and we accept q because it is evident that it follows from r, and so on; but sooner or later we must reach a proposition whose truth does not depend on its implication by any other proposition. Descartes speaks sometimes as if there were only one such proposition—the assertion by the thinker of his own conscious existence; and this was certainly for him the only self-evident proposition which had existence as its predicate. But it is clear that he admits as ultimate and self-evident a number of other propositions, such as the mathematical axioms and the axiom of causality. From these self-evident propositions every other scientific truth is arrived at by means of clear and evident steps.

What then are we to say of the first ethical proposition that enters into a system of thought of this kind—the first proposition, that is to say, that has 'good' or some similar ethical concept as its predicate? Of two things one: either this proposition is self-evident and without dependence on a preceding proposition, or the only evidence in the case is its implication by some preceding proposition which, *ex hypothesi*, is not an ethical proposition. If the former is the case, then the ethical proposition marks a new beginning, and is not derived from any set of purely theoretical propositions; and it must be recognised as having independent validity, if not necessarily primacy or control over others, when

the thinker proceeds to unify or systematise his knowledge and attempt an interpretation of things as a whole. In the latter case—if it is held to be evident that a certain ethical proposition follows from a non-ethical proposition—further questions arise.

Now the former of these alternatives is adopted by many writers who, by reason of their method, may be counted among the Rationalists. It is the prevailing doctrine of the Intuitional moralists and may be found in the Scholastics before them. Certain ethical propositions—such as those that affirm that justice, veracity, and the common welfare are good—are held to be self-evident, not derived from mathematical, causal, or any other purely theoretical propositions. When this position is taken up ethics as a science is not made dependent upon metaphysics. It is allowed a place of its own. Ethical truths and truths of theoretical philosophy will be regarded as arrived at in the same way, and they will be dealt with by the same rational methods; but there will be no primacy of one over the other; if metaphysics is not a result of ethics, neither is ethics derived from metaphysics. And this method, so far as regards ethics, has been often employed by writers like Richard Price, who have not worked out any metaphysical system, as well as by others—Reid, for example—whose ethical doctrine is part of a general philosophical view. Such theories do not derive their ethical principle from an antecedent and non-ethical metaphysics, though any comprehensive or philosophical view of this kind must show in what way ethical and theoretical propositions can be combined into a system.

If, on the other hand, we take the latter line of

thought, and derive ethical truths from non-ethical premisses—as the Cartesians generally, and Geulincx in particular, seem to have wished to do—then also our ethical propositions must begin somewhere. There must be some proposition which, in our system, contains for the first time an ethical notion; and we shall accept this proposition not because, standing by itself, it is self-evident, but because it is implied by a preceding proposition which, *ex hypothesi*, does not contain any ethical notion. How is it possible for this to be? Where are the non-ethical premisses which, of themselves, justify an ethical conclusion?

This question is never faced, so far as I can make out. Goodness is found in different directions by different thinkers of the same school. Sometimes, as by Geulincx, it is held to belong only to the will, which is powerless to effect changes in the world of sense but is supreme in its own narrow field. Sometimes, as by Spinoza, it is regarded as belonging to the knowledge and realisation of one's own being as a mode of the ultimate reality. But, whatever the subject of our proposition when we say "this being, or this kind of life, or this attitude, is good," the predicate 'good' enters as a new notion which is superadded to, and not derived from, the logical or mathematical or causal relations already involved. Self-evidence may be claimed for the ethical proposition itself, but it is never shown to be logically implied by the antecedent propositions. They have been on a different plane of thought. The assertion of goodness is not really arrived at by deduction from any assertions about existence; it marks the beginning of a new line of thought. Thus it was that the Rationalists of the seventeenth

century failed to get to ethics by way of logical deduction from principles about knowledge and reality which were not themselves ethical, and by a method which was imitated from mathematical proof.

In very much the same way, the Naturalists of the nineteenth century failed in their attempt to reach ethical propositions by an extension of causal propositions. If we take Spencer as representing this view, we may find in him the promise of a new and scientific doctrine in which ethical principles shall have their true place in a universal and systematic philosophy, wherein everything is to be deduced from the doctrine of the persistence of force. But the promise of proof is not kept: it is broken just at the point where its fulfilment would have been of the greatest interest—when consciousness emerges from the play of competing physiological reflexes. After this point the pretence of deduction is cast aside. Causation, however, is still the clue; and we look for the transition from the causal to the ethical judgment. The chain of causation is crossed, however, in Spencer's exposition by a new line of argument, when he quietly assumes as self-evident a proposition which is not causal at all, but strictly ethical—the proposition that pleasure and pleasure alone is good. The line of cause and effect is not altogether deserted by him; and other exponents of evolutionary ethics keep to it more consistently. In all their expositions, however, one truth becomes apparent: that as long as the argument is logical, it has no ethical consequences; and that, when ethical propositions enter, they have not been reached by any logical process. It is not always that writers are content, with the naïveté of Sir Francis Galton, to formulate the 'new

duty' of following evolution ; they more frequently pass from the assertion of a certain evolutionary tendency to the assumption that it has ethical value, without stopping to reflect on the audacious leap they have taken over a logical fence[1]. Nevertheless, their service to clear thought on this subject has been none the less real because it has been unintentional. Their exposition has made clearer than ever the distinction which they have so palpably ignored—the distinction between 'is' and 'ought,' between existence and value or goodness. And, indirectly, they have done the good service of drawing attention to the tendency to overlook this distinction in other systems of philosophy as well as in their own.

2. Ethical ideas, we may therefore assert, are not due simply to the application of metaphysical or theoretical conceptions to the subject-matter of conduct. This method of metaphysical ethics will not work. There remains the other and more promising method. According to it the purely theoretical conceptions with which metaphysics begins are inadequate to the interpretation of reality, but criticism of them reveals a content which was not present, or at least was not explicit, at the outset. In this way these initial conceptions lead on by a logical process to the conceptions which express the ethical nature of reality.

This method has its classical expression in Hegel's dialectic. He passes, by successive steps, from the most formal and empty of all conceptions to the fullest and

[1] The ethical system of Naturalism has been examined in an earlier work, to which reference may be made : see *Ethics of Naturalism*, 2nd ed., 1904.

most concrete. The logical evolution of the notion begins with a conception completely void of content and, by its own characteristic logic, advances to mind or spirit. "This," says Hegel, "is the supreme definition of the Absolute." But "the essential feature of mind or spirit is liberty," and this free mind expresses itself in morality and law[1]. Questions of difficulty arise at each step of the long argument by which this result is reached. But the method followed is, at least, a conceivable method; and, as it shows the derivation of the ethical notion, it might appear that an independent study of the latter and of its implications would be unnecessary, and that its meaning is to be ascertained by examining the logical conditions which determine its place in the evolution of the notion.

It is, however, only on one of the possible interpretations of a dialectic process that this view of the matter can be maintained. With Hegel himself, we may lay stress on what may be called the intellectual character of the process, and assert that the development of thought is a purely inner development: the might of the notion will then be looked upon as producing from its own nature the whole fulness of the life of the spirit. 'Being' logically equates with 'nothing,' and yet there is a transition from one to the other, and this transition is 'becoming': and so through the whole gamut of categories until we reach the morality and law of civilised society. Now, if it is the mere might of the notion that is at work here, the last stage must be from the first implicit in the earliest. We shall be compelled to regard the whole process of evolution traced in the dialectic

[1] *Encyklopädie*, §§ 382, 384, 487.

as the philosophical analogue of the old biological notion of preformation, according to which the germ contains within itself, in ultra-microscopic minuteness, all the wealth of the organism with which it is continuous. Evolution, as interpreted by the preformation theory in contrast with the theory of epigenesis, is simply the expansion of characters and parts always present but too small at first to be visible. In this sense the full-grown organism was supposed to be implicit in the cell from which it originated. Does 'implicit' have the same meaning when the term is used of the logical evolution? Are the spirits of just men made perfect implicit, in this sense, in the bare notion 'being' with which Hegel starts? Is their essence already contained in it, however indistinctly, and however much in need of the micro-scopic power of the *Logic* to bring it to light? If it is, then it is impossible that this 'being' so full of character can be the same as nothing: and the dialectic refuses to march.

That this view of the dialectic is "a mere caricature" of all that is valuable in Hegel may well be admitted. Hegel himself tried to distinguish his method from the preformation theory of evolution. It is "only ideally or in thought," he said, "that the earlier stage virtually involves the later[1]." "Before the mind," says Mr Bradley, "there is a single conception, but the whole mind itself, which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the *datum*, and produces the result[2]." In this operation the mind must surely impart something from its own fulness; and in the process it is always

[1] *Encyklopädie*, § 161.

[2] *Principles of Logic*, p. 381.

receiving new data which affect its operation. The mind never has simply a single conception before it, any more than it has ever a simple idea of the Locke-Hume variety. We admit, in this way, that the evolution of the notion resembles epigenesis—that the development of thought includes the assimilation of new experience. And if we do this, we give up the old view of logical evolution, as much as the biologists of to-day have given up the old view of organic evolution. We admit the fact of epigenesis. The development of an organism is not a process of unrolling or expanding material which has been present all along. The organism is related to its environment by give and take, and its growth is conditioned by this interaction. Does not something similar hold true of the process by which thought advances to new and more adequate conceptions of reality?

If we adopt this view a dialectical development of concepts will still be possible; but it will not claim to be determined at each stage simply by the mere content of the preceding concepts. The concept will be regarded as having for its function the knowledge of an object, and its nature will lie in this function. As we ascend from less to more adequate concepts, our test of adequacy will be not merely inner freedom from contradiction, but also ability to describe and interpret reality; and our concepts will be formed for the purpose of including the new material which experience presents. From this point of view the relation of concepts and of the sciences becomes intelligible. Mathematical concepts, for example, do not pretend to exhaust the nature of the real world. They exhibit certain abstract relations only, and are in this way inadequate to knowledge of reality, and

indeed professedly inadequate. But this inadequacy is not the result of an inherent contradiction or of any defect in the concepts themselves. On the contrary they admit of indefinite elaboration without falling into contradiction. It is only if we use them for a purpose for which they are not fitted—if we attempt through them alone to understand any concrete situation—that there is discrepancy between what is to be explained and what is explained. Neither the wish of a man nor the fall of a pebble can be accounted for by mathematics alone. And, while they make plain their own inadequacy to describe the full nature of the concrete, they give no hint as to the kind of concepts by which they have to be supplemented in order to serve this purpose. In the same way, when it is argued that mechanism is inadequate to account for vital processes, it is not meant that mechanism is a self-contradictory system, but only that it is insufficient for the explanation of certain facts or of certain aspects of facts. And so at each step where one concept is replaced by another. Throughout our procedure intellect never works *in vacuo*; it is an effort after the understanding of an object, of reality. For a fuller view of reality new concepts are needed, and these new concepts are not derived, dialectically or otherwise, merely from antecedent concepts. In no case do concepts appear out of the empty intellect independently of the material of experience. They are a way of dealing with and ordering such material, and their entry into consciousness is determined thereby. Our intellectual concepts of cause and purpose, for instance, are based upon experiences in our own activity; and the same is true of our ethical concepts.

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These reflexions are not put forward as supplying the place of a full examination of metaphysical ethics. But they may serve to prepare the mind for a constructive effort of a different kind by showing the fundamental difficulties in the way of any theory which seeks to derive ethical notions from notions which are not ethical. The same problem confronts all such theories—the problem of accounting for the introduction of an ethical concept into the argument. And, whatever the special method they adopt, these different theories betray the same obscurity at the crucial point. The rationalist hesitates to say whether his first ethical proposition is in its own nature self-evident, or is implied by non-ethical propositions. The latter alternative has never been put forward clearly; and the former alternative allows an independent beginning for ethics. The difficulty is similar if the dialectical evolution of concepts be followed. Non-ethical concepts are inadequate for the description of an experience which includes moral factors; they may prove their own inadequacy, but they do not themselves supply the deficiency. The ethical concept could never have been evolved out of non-ethical antecedents and without the help of moral experience; and this experience must therefore be taken into account by any metaphysics which professes to be ethical.

The fault which is to be found with metaphysical ethics is, in the end, just this, that its data are insufficient. It tends to disregard that portion of experience which is of greatest importance for its purpose, namely, moral experience. It bases ethics upon metaphysics, and metaphysics is an interpretation of experience; but it starts from a limited view of experience, and tries to

pass to ethical concepts without taking into account those factors in experience which are relevant to the later enquiry, though they may not have been required for the earlier stages. The data of experience which philosophy has to interpret are not limited to sense-perception and the material of scientific knowledge; they include the facts of desire and volition which are formative forces in the structure of life; and, in addition, they include also the experience of moral approval and disapproval and, generally, the whole appreciation of value. This last is the special region of experience from which ethical concepts arise. It is a marked accompaniment of the active life—of the life of desire and volition—but it reacts upon and colours the whole of experience.

It may be allowed that, when we occupy ourselves with this aspect of experience, it has a tendency to divert our attention from the purely logical or purely causal order in which the scientific intelligence regards its objects; it may thus interfere with the spirit of pure science; and, for that reason, it may be well to banish sternly from our minds the attitude of moral or æsthetic appreciation when our purpose is simply to understand the connexions of phenomena. The more severely we keep to the logical and causal points of view the better it will be for our mathematical and physical knowledge. The perfection of these sciences depends upon their limitation; and the more perfect they are, the more clearly are they separated from ethical appreciation, and the more impossible is it to pass directly from the logical or causal to the ethical judgment. The latter is based upon an aspect of experience overlooked or deliberately

disregarded by the sciences, and deals with it by the use of concepts which would have been confusing and irrelevant in mathematics or physics. But the aspect which science neglects is none the less fundamental in life. And, when we clearly recognise the importance of this phase of experience—the facts of moral approval and disapproval, that is to say—we are prepared to recognise the unique position of the ethical concept. This justifies an independent beginning for ethics itself, and at the same time leads us to expect that moral experience and ethical ideas may have a contribution of their own to make to the interpretation of the world.

This formulates our problem. Morality is a factor in experience; ethical ideas have a place in consciousness. Our theory of reality as a whole must take account of these things; and the question concerns the difference which they make in our final view of the world and in the arguments which lead up to that view. To approach this question systematically it will be necessary to devote a little time to the description of ethical ideas and their place in experience, so that we may be prepared to decide whether there is any truth in the dictum that we must seek in that which *should be* for the ground of that which *is*.

II

VALUES

PHILOSOPHY is a result of the contemplative attitude to things, in which man observes them and reasons about them, but does not himself take part in bringing about the events which he seeks to understand. It is born of leisure, therefore. The work of thought may be strenuous enough itself; it must necessarily be strenuous to attain its end; but, for this very reason, it requires a mind aloof from affairs, withdrawn from the ordinary business of life, indifferent to the practical activity which leaves little room for contemplation and disturbs its serenity. The thinker is expected to regard all things with equal mind; his business is with their nature and connexions only; he is the servant of truth alone, and, at its demand, it is held that he must put aside the common prejudice in favour of the good or beautiful or useful.

The growth of science also encourages the same attitude. Science, it is true, is distinguished from philosophy by the multiplicity and importance of its practical applications. The present time, beyond all others, is the day of the achievements of applied science, and it is for the sake of its application to the arts of life that science itself is held in honour by an impatient public. The connexion is very close between principles and

application: the latter would not exist were it not for the former; and the former would lose encouragement and stimulus—would perhaps never have been recognised—had it not been for their promise of a power over the environment which should minister to man's desires. But, even with a view to their subsequent applications to practical affairs, it is not well that the man of science should have these interests constantly before his eyes. The practical interest is apt to interfere with the theoretical interest, to make impartiality difficult and to weaken the concentration of mind which successful enquiry needs. Hence the current and familiar specialisation. In the foreground is the inventor who ministers to the demands of industry; behind him stands the scientific enquirer who, by an arduous method, discovers the principles which another puts to practical use. The sphere of values is accordingly assigned to the inventor and taken out of the hands of the scientific discoverer.

Further, it is recognised that the world is a process of evolution, or at least that it is in continual change. But mere change cannot be made an object of knowledge. Thought seeks the permanent within or behind the changes; and it is only in so far as constant factors can be discovered in it that the changing process becomes the object of knowledge. The contrast between the flux of experience and conceptual fixity has even led certain thinkers to adopt the view that the intellect necessarily tends to pervert reality by substituting a fixed concept for that which actually is always in process of change or growth. With this view we are not at present concerned. But it is true that science looks for constancies, for the permanent law rather than for

the changing event. Even if it be true that change is as necessary to permanence as permanence is to change, the preference of science is for the permanent.

The same attitude is apt to persist even when man and his ideals are the object of reflexion. It is often forgotten that man himself is an agent in the world's changing course, and that his agency is determined by his ideals: that he selects between possible lines of action and that his selection may be determined by his judgment of what is good or better. Human agency is thus one of the factors of that world of experience which both science and philosophy set out to explain; and human agency is affected by conceptions or ideals of value. In this way, values belong to the object which we have to explain when man himself is included among the objects of enquiry. Further, as a fact of mental life, the experience or consciousness of value is as fundamental as the experience or consciousness of events. Man is not a cognitive being in the first instance, and only thereafter an active being. Knowledge is sought by him in virtue of some interest; and the interest in knowledge for its own sake is a late acquisition. Primarily, he seeks to know in order that he may turn his knowledge to some use beyond the mere knowledge: it has to serve to control his environment or to adapt him to it. He wishes to understand a thing because understanding it will make him in some degree its master. The attitude of valuation, accordingly, may even be said to have priority in the development of mind over the attitude of cognition.

The primary experience, on which all later views of the world and of self are built, is not perceptive merely,

it is also appreciative. It involves in every part some consciousness or appreciation of worth or value, as well as the consciousness of objects as existing and changing. The distinction between the two attitudes itself belongs to the growth of mind. The primary experience is at once perceptive and appreciative; its object is both an existence and a value; but the two elements have to be discriminated for the sake of understanding and of practice alike. The whole system of scientific knowledge is arrived at by means of a preliminary abstraction —by restricting attention to the nature and laws of the things observed and disregarding the element of value which they are experienced as somehow possessing or entailing. And this abstraction is itself a selection determined by an interest. By a similar and equally valid abstraction we may concentrate attention on the aspect of value, which is omitted by the sciences, and construct a theory of value which will supplement, and in some sense correspond with, the scientific theory of facts and relations. The final problem will concern the relation of the two systems, when thought seeks in the end to restore the harmony into which it has broken. One of these systems—the scientific view which does not concern itself with values—may be regarded as sufficiently well known in its general character. But some account is necessary of the complementary system of values: although that account must be restricted to certain leading features, important for their bearing on the final problem.

The varieties of value are clearly distinguished only in the mature consciousness; and their enumeration

must not be mistaken for a psychological account of their genesis, any more than a classification of the sciences is to be confused with a psychology of cognition. We have to distinguish kinds of value, not different ways in which we become conscious of value, although we may expect difference in the objects to be correlated with a difference in the conscious attitude to them. And values may be discriminated in different ways according to the principle of division adopted. Some of these ways may be described as formal; but one distinction has special regard to content, and with this distinction a beginning may be made.

In the first place, then, values may be distinguished into kinds according to the nature of the objects or ideals to which they have reference or within which they may be included. It is impossible, at the outset, to lay down a principle for determining all the different varieties of value, and the distinctions which we draw may conceal a unity of system which will be disclosed in the course of further analysis. We must start from a preliminary and empirical classification. In this way we may enumerate happiness, beauty, goodness, and truth as comprehensive descriptions under which many particular experiences of value may be brought, and as expressive of ideals to which worth is undoubtedly assigned.

The first of these ideals—happiness—is that which is most commonly in our mouths and appeals most forcibly to the plain man. Almost everyone admits that what contributes to happiness is of value; some are willing to say that this is the very meaning of value. But, when we come to look at the conception happiness more closely, this first view seems to need amendment.

A man's happiness may consist in realising or in contemplating beautiful things, or in the pursuit of goodness, or in the search for and attainment of truth, or in the gratification of some strong passion, such as the love of power, or in the work-a-day life from which reflexion is banished, or in passing from enjoyment to enjoyment. The content of the notion happiness will differ according as it signifies one or other of these things, or some combination of them. And a notion which, like this, may mean anything comes very near to meaning nothing. It becomes a mere form into which any, or almost any, view of the worth of life may be fitted. There is, however, one positive element in the notion happiness, and to this element due regard must be paid. It implies always the simple but positive element pleasure.

Expressions are occasionally to be met with in some writers—Bentham is an example[1]—which seem to imply that the words pleasant and good have the same meaning. But this identification, or apparent identification, of two different ideas is probably due to nothing more than an impatience with any divergence from the doctrine of hedonism. It certainly overlooks a clear distinction. That something is pleasant is a fact of immediate experience—that and nothing more. That this pleasure is good or worthy or has value is a further assertion. This is shown by the fact that it is at least open to dispute whether certain pleasures have value or are in any way good. Malicious pleasure is a case in point. On the one hand it must be held by the hedonist that while malice itself is bad, or has negative

[1] *E.g.*, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 7 and chap. ii (ed. of 1879).

value, the malicious man's pleasure in his evil deed is an element of good or positive value in the total experience. On the other hand it is maintained that this pleasure has in it no element of good at all—that it even makes the total experience worse than it would have been had the malicious act failed to bring pleasure to the agent or had it stirred in him a conscientious pain. It is not necessary to argue the point on its merits. All that is necessary is to make clear that there is no contradiction in holding that the malice which is accompanied by pleasure is worse than the malice which is not, or, in other words, that there are some cases of pleasure which are not in themselves good. Consequently, when the assertion is made that pleasure, or pleasure alone, is of value, the predicate adds something to the subject of the proposition—the meaning is not the same as if one said 'pleasure is pleasant.' The assertion is not a tautology; and, if hedonism is of any significance as an ethical theory, it is because its fundamental proposition that pleasure alone is of value is a synthetic proposition and not merely analytic or verbal.

Hedonism is of course a familiar doctrine both in ordinary life and in philosophy. Its philosophical importance consists largely in its attempt to make ethics a quantitative science by introducing a single standard by which values of all kinds may be measured. It has no difficulty in laying down the principle; but it has never achieved precision, or gained general assent, in its manner of applying it to the details of life. Spiritual goods cannot be measured against material on the same scale. There is not sufficient evidence to show that a society of Socrateses would experience more pleasure

than a society of fools—or, at least, than a society of ordinary people who enjoyed material goods and did not trouble themselves or their neighbours by asking inconvenient questions. The hedonist philosopher has commonly preferred the goods of the mind not because he could prove them to be more pleasant, but because he held them to be more noble. The feeling of pleasure, real and positive as it is, partakes in this connexion of the formality which belongs to the ideal of happiness. It belongs to every kind of value when realised in its fulness, and in some degree belongs to every realisation of value. It may be regarded as a feeling of value, but it is not a measure or standard of value. Although it accompanies all experiences of value, it does not express their distinctive nature or enable us to discriminate their differences. Accordingly, as pleasure does not explain or measure value, it seems better also not to speak of it as an independent kind of value. It attaches itself to value of every kind, instead of being one kind amongst the others.

The remaining kinds of value which have been already enumerated are the æsthetic, the moral, and the intellectual, corresponding to the traditional ideals of the beautiful, the good, and the true.

Among these difficulty arises regarding the inclusion of intellectual value. It is maintained by an active school of thinkers that truth is simply a concise expression for working efficiency, that it is capable of analysis into certain other values, and that all so-called intellectual values have their real value in relation to some other function than intellectual apprehension. On this view,

truth, although a value, would not be regarded as one of the fundamental kinds of value. The view appeals for support to the practical interests which determine the beginnings of knowledge. But it overlooks the independent interest in knowing which characterises the maturity of the human mind. Truth has been found to possess a value which is not capable of being resolved into other and practical interests, and which must therefore be regarded as independent. It is the object and the attainment of intelligence alone and can in this way be distinguished from happiness or goodness or beauty. The proper attitude of the intelligence to a true proposition, or to a system of true propositions, is simply belief or assent; and this is an intellectual attitude different from the mere enjoyment of happiness, the moral approval of goodness, or the artistic admiration of beauty. This difference, however, suggests another question. If we call truth a value, do we not thereby obliterate the distinction with which we started between cognition and appreciation? The answer to this question seems to be that the true proposition, merely as true, is not a value apart from the intelligence which understands and appropriates it. It is knowledge of truth, or truth as known, that has value. Man as a thinking being finds value in the truth which he seeks; it may even become the chief aim of his life, and he cherishes it on its own account—not as something alien to himself, but as completing or perfecting his own intellectual nature.

Moral and æsthetic values are closely connected—so closely that they have sometimes been identified. But even a little reflexion brings out differences that may not be ignored. In the first place there is a

subjective distinction. The mental attitude by which we apprehend or detect beauty is not the same as that in which we become aware of goodness. Both, however, differ from the intellectual attitude in knowledge; and the term appreciation may be used for both kinds of valuation. But this term covers attitudes of mind which are not the same. Our appreciation of a beautiful sunset, for example, differs from our appreciation of a good deed or a good character. The former is admiration simply, the latter approval.

No doubt the attitudes may be combined. Admiration of a work of art is often conveyed in terms which express approbation or approval also. Not only do we speak of a good picture or a good artist, but this phrase may indicate not merely admiration of the work, but approval of it and its author. On the other hand, æsthetic terms are used for moral excellence: the Hebrew praised the 'beauty of holiness'; the Greek conception of *καλοκαγαθία* signified the union of art and morality at their highest point; and, in the modern phrase 'a beautiful soul,' a term of æsthetic admiration is used to express high moral approbation. Even in these phrases, however, what is expressed seems to be the combination of two modes of appreciation rather than their identity. The 'beautiful soul' is an object of æsthetic admiration, but this object is the result of dispositions and activities to which moral approval is appropriate. The moral object—the soul that is in harmony with the moral ideal—is also an object of æsthetic admiration: the good, when fully realised, is in this case seen to be something that is also beautiful in itself. And, when we use terms of moral approval for the æsthetic object, we can perhaps

discover that our thoughts have passed from the object as beautiful to another aspect of the situation. We do not speak of a sunset as good instead of beautiful, or, if we do, we recognise that we are not using the word 'good' in its ethical meaning. It is more common to apply the term 'good' to the work of human art and still more common to apply it to the artist ; and in these cases, moral approval may be implied ; but this moral approval is something superadded to æsthetic admiration and not identical with it. We admire the work without any thought of how it was done or even who did it ; but when we approve (in the ethical sense) it is with reference to the conscious activity of the artist who used his skill to realise the ideal which he was able to conceive.

Moreover, instances are also common in which the two attitudes diverge. The same concrete situation may call forth moral approval combined with æsthetic depreciation, or æsthetic admiration combined with moral disapproval. We approve without admiring, or admire and at the same time condemn. The moral character or good deed may be spoiled for our æsthetic sense by awkwardness or lack of grace. Great crimes may call forth our reluctant admiration by the manner in which they are devised and carried out: there was no inconsistency in De Quincey's description of 'murder as a fine art.' Or a whole career, such as that of Napoleon, may appeal to our æsthetic sense although it is condemned by our moral judgment.

In the second place, the distinction between the æsthetic and the moral judgment is confirmed when we examine their respective objects. Any work of fine art, anything we call beautiful, has a certain independence

and completeness in itself[1]. To use an illustration of Professor Stewart's, "Hermes is dug up at Olympia, and we find him beautiful as soon as we see him[2]." The dust of centuries has hidden his beauty, but has not changed it. We may know nothing of his origin or history: who the sculptor was, or what his purpose, when the work was completed, or what temple it was meant to adorn. All these are but accessory circumstances of interest to the scholar. Knowledge about them may perhaps add to our admiration; but ignorance of them can do little to impair it; the eye is satisfied with seeing. The artistic object is something aloof and by itself, like the Platonic ideas—"all breathing human passion far above." Contemplation of it lifts us out of the life of action and thinking, and of their values:

> Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought
> As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral!
> When old age shall this generation waste,
> Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
> Than ours, a friend to man.

But Keats mistook its message when he read its lesson as "beauty is truth, truth beauty." This is a confusion of values. Beauty is beauty, and that is enough. Æsthetic contemplation rests upon a certain external and sensuous content, and does not need to go beyond this content either to intellectual meanings or to the context of circumstances in which it was produced. The material object is of itself sufficient to provoke and to justify admiring contemplation: even knowledge of the

[1] Cp. H. Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 2nd ed., p. 75.

[2] *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. 1, p. 183.

artist's purpose is unessential; far less is it necessary to enquire into his state of mind and to know what sort of a man he was. The sensuous object, in form and content, is that to which beauty fundamentally belongs; when we speak of beauties of mind and character, we are conscious that we are using æsthetic terminology in a sense which, if perfectly just, is yet derivative and not fundamental.

It is different with moral appreciation. Even if our primary moral judgments seem to have an external application, a little criticism makes it clear that the external thing has only instrumental goodness and can never have intrinsic goodness. If we speak of a good character, it is clear that the moral approval has respect to the soul and not to the body; even when we speak of a good deed, reflexion convinces us that the mere overt act whereby things in space change their places is not in itself good or evil; its value, if it have any, can be instrumental only: that is to say, it is regarded as a cause of what is good, but not as good in itself. The action to be appreciated as moral must be taken from its inner side. The rescue from drowning—to use a time-honoured illustration—will be approved or disapproved according as the intention was to restore to a life of usefulness or to reserve for future torture. We must always go back to the inner aspect of conduct —the intention; and the intention never stands alone, as something holding for this case only and having no relation to anything else. It is part of a system of conduct. Thus the approval of a single act or incident is a judgment concerned with the inner life, and apt to be concerned with the whole life. We cannot disregard the

motive—as we do in the case of the artist—or be indifferent to what sort of a man the agent was. Moral judgments have not the completeness and independence of æsthetic judgments. From the first, if they do not form a system, they depend upon a system.

These different kinds of value depend upon a difference in the objects valued. Certain formal distinctions remain which call for explanation. The most obvious and important of these distinctions is that between Intrinsic and Instrumental value. A thing may have value or worth in itself quite apart from anything else to which it leads; and this is called intrinsic value. On the other hand, when we call a thing good or say that it has value, we are often aware that we use the term not for what the thing is in itself, but because of something else which follows from it as an effect. Thus a surgical operation may be said to be good, not, certainly, because it has any intrinsic worth in itself and apart from its consequences, but because it may be a means of prolonging life or restoring health: and we assume that life and health are good in themselves or (if they are not) that they causally determine something else which is good in itself. Consequently, where we make use of a proposition which asserts merely instrumental value, value does not, strictly speaking, belong to the subject of the proposition. What we ascribe to that subject is not value but causal efficiency to bring about something else which is assumed or implied to possess value. Assertions of instrumental value, being thus causal propositions, are at the same time utility-propositions: the thing is said to be useful as leading to something else which is of intrinsic value.

The weight of any thorough enquiry must therefore fall upon the conception of intrinsic value, and it might seem that the conception of instrumental value could be dismissed at once as having to do solely with causal relations. But the case is not so simple; and some further enquiry is necessary into the relation of instrumental to intrinsic value.

The science in which the conception of value has been used with greatest effect is economics; and it may be well to consider for a moment the economic conception of value, for in economics 'value' has a well-defined meaning. The value of any economic good is determined by its relation to other things which can be got in exchange for it; and when we have in money a general measure of the ratio in which things can be exchanged for one another, the measurement of value is easy: a thing's value is its price. The term 'value,' in this sense, is what the economist also calls 'value in exchange'; it is an instrumental value, a means of getting something else; and to this use the term 'value' is generally restricted in economic reasoning. To understand its further significance needs a little examination of the concept. The value of any article *A* consists in its relation to the amounts of other articles (say *B*, *C*, and *D*) or any one or more of them which can be got in exchange for it. The value of *B*, in the same way, will consist in its relation to the amounts of *A*, *C*, and *D*, or any one or more of them, which can be got in exchange for it. Similarly of the values of *C* and *D*. And, if we measure the value of all commodities by money, then money itself has to be valued in terms of these other commodities: for it, after all, is one

commodity amongst others. Thus the attempt to define the economic value of any one commodity always lands us, in the long run, in a circle—provided we keep to this meaning of value as instrumental. The circular nature of the definition is only hidden from us because we commonly define the value in relation to a common measure, money, and overlook for the moment the fact that the value of money itself must be defined in relation to other articles. Hence the economic conception of value (that is, of value in exchange) is found on analysis to depend on commodities having some other value than this—a value which is independent of their relation to other commodities. That is to say, value in exchange rests ultimately upon what Adam Smith called 'value in use,' and what Jevons and others after him have called simply 'utility.' The term 'utility' would not have been retained by economists unless it had been found convenient; but it is no more correct here than in some of its ethical uses. It does not clearly distinguish intrinsic value from value in exchange, because the latter is also a kind of utility; and utility, indeed, should mean usefulness for something, and thus imply that very reference to another thing which, in this place, it is introduced to avoid. Adam Smith's term 'value in use,' though somewhat clumsy, is really more correct than the simpler term 'utility.' The point which it is desired to bring out is that the commodity has a value in itself, which is not dependent on its relation to other things which it produces or which may be got for it. The people who desire it desire it for its own sake—to use, as Adam Smith says, or simply to enjoy. This value is independent of exchange; and when a thing has this value,

people are willing to do something or to give up something in order to possess it. The things they do or give up have value in exchange, or instrumental value, and perhaps that only. But this thing, which has a value independent of exchange, possesses intrinsic value or worth—at least from the point of view of economic science.

The economist has his scale of values, and can adjust all economic goods to their proper places on the scale. But the goods receive their places on the scale not in virtue of their own intrinsic quality, but because of what can be got for them—for what they will bring in money, or according to their relation to some more intricate standard. The economist may recognise intrinsic value as the basis upon which his values rest; but he measures these by an external standard: his whole valuation, therefore, is extrinsic. If we attempt to measure things by their intrinsic worth—if, for instance, we raise the question of the importance of economic goods in life as a whole—we shall have to seek out some way of determining intrinsic values, which will be entirely different from the scale of the economists and which may assign the highest place to goods unrecognised on the economic scale[1].

An attempt to measure intrinsic values would raise questions hard to answer. Are economic goods, for instance, to have a place on this scale? and if so at what point? Or are they all—the whole material apparatus of life, that is to say—to be regarded as having instrumental value only? Merely to state this question is to

[1] Cp. 'Ethical Aspects of Economics,' *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. XVII (1907), pp. 1 ff., 317 ff., 437 ff.

show that the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value is not of such easy application as it seemed to be at the first glance. Obviously, the surgical operation has instrumental value only, the medical art is good, but not good in itself—only as a means for restoring health or preserving life. But what of health, or long life? Are these good in themselves, or only as means to happiness, or social efficiency, or some other end? The mere statement of these questions is suggestive of controversy.

And a further consideration has also to be taken into account. For a little experience shows us that the same thing may be both an end-in-itself and also a means to something else that has value. Knowledge, for instance, may be good in itself, that is, have intrinsic value; and knowledge may lead to sympathy, and so have instrumental value also. And sympathy may have intrinsic value; but it may also react upon and stimulate knowledge, as well as affect other persons by deeds of beneficence, and thus have at the same time instrumental value. The category of means and end, under which we are striving to understand value, does not give us a single clear line of advance. Just as, in nature, we do not find one thing which is simply cause, and another thing which is simply effect, but interaction is the rule, so here, means and end are interwoven in the complex fabric of life.

The category of means and end is indeed an imperfect guide for identifying and discriminating values. It is a useful and necessary distinction for our thinking; but life overruns it, and sometimes obliterates it in its continuous process. Where do the means end, and

where does the end begin? Is it winning only that is the end of the game? or is the game its own end which victory crowns with an added worth? The means, it may be said, may in such a case have an intrinsic value of their own in addition to their instrumental value as leading to the end, and the total value of the whole experience will be the sum of the intrinsic values of means and of end. But this does not state the truth fully; the total value cannot be arrived at by mere addition[1]. It may even be that, in certain experiences, neither the means alone nor the end alone has any intrinsic value. Is it not often the case that you would not play the game at all—that it would have no value for you—unless you had a chance of winning? and, on the other hand, that you would not value victory at all except as the result of the game? What we hold as good may be the end reached in this particular way or by these means. Means and end shade into one another in experience, and no value at all may belong to one of them apart from the other. Or it may be that each has some value in itself, but that the value of the whole realised experience is greater than the sum of the values which would belong to its parts if taken separately.

Ethical analysis does not stop at the same point as psychological analysis or physical division stops. Generally it stops much earlier. We may proceed with our psychological analysis far beyond the point at which value has disappeared from the factors into which the experience is analysed. The simplest things to which it is possible to assign value may be very complex things in their actual existence; and the whole of which we

[1] Cp. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 28.

can be sure that its full intrinsic value is there to be seen, if we have insight to see it, may be a very comprehensive whole indeed.

It is customary to draw a distinction between Permanent and Transient values. All mental states may be viewed in respect of their duration; they last for a longer or shorter time, and the time admits of exact measurement. Duration has thus a prominent place among the conditions through which Bentham sought to measure the value of a lot of pleasure or pain[1], and thereby to transform ethics into a quantitative science. It was in the attempted measurement of intensity that the chief pitfalls for him lay; with duration he seemed to have no difficulty. Taking a second or other short interval as the unit of his reckoning, he estimated the value of a continuous experience by multiplying its intensity into the number of seconds which it lasted. Even this measurement, however, proceeded upon an assumption —the assumption that the pleasure or pain which was regarded as a continuous experience was of identical intensity throughout its duration; and this assumption is not justified by the facts. Thus even in the measurement of duration the hedonic calculus is in difficulties, not because we cannot count time, but because we may not assume that the experience which endures remains of constant intensity. This difficulty may be circumvented by estimating degrees of permanence in another way. Instead of looking to the immediate conscious experience, which varies from moment to moment, we may measure the permanence of the objects to which

[1] *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (ed. of 1879), p. 29.

we attribute value, or of the mental dispositions or interests which are the conditions of our enjoyment of these objects. The later utilitarians commonly followed this course, and Bentham did not ignore its applications. For them, as for Bentham, value ultimately lay only in the immediate experience, which is in constant flux; but they recommended their disciples to turn their eyes from it and seek rather the possession of the objects, and the cultivation of the interests, from which pleasure normally followed. Although pleasures were transient, they had sources which were comparatively permanent and which might give stability to human values.

The attitude recommended by the utilitarians is not necessarily restricted to the hedonic interpretation of value. The attainment of value is always determined by objects, whether material things or other factors in the environment; it is also conditioned by the dispositions and interests of the persons in whom the value is realised. And in both these respects there may be varying degrees of permanence. As regards the objective conditions, it has been customary for the proverbial philosopher to depreciate material things—all that is commonly called wealth—as transient and the prey of moth and rust; our hold on them is without doubt uncertain, and the enjoyment which they yield is apt to diminish with years. On the other hand social objects, such as "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends," are held to be more lasting, although they too cannot be affirmed to be permanent, even when the person is worthy of them. It is obvious that, as long as we are dealing with temporal objects, we cannot assert anything more than relative permanence. Only ideal objects, conceived

as independent of time, can be called permanent in the strict sense. Such are the 'eternal values' of truth, beauty, and goodness; such also is the love of God.

It may seem easier to draw the distinction from the side of personal dispositions than from that of their objects; but here also there are divergent estimates. There is an old controversy between the sensualist and the philosopher as to whose pleasures are the greater, and this controversy has been looked upon as settled only because the philosopher has been allowed to give literary expression to the debate, and has summed up in his own favour. As he puts the case, he alone has experience of the pleasures of knowledge as well as of those of sense, and as he prefers the former his judgment must be accepted without appeal. Perhaps he has not summed up quite fairly; and the sensualist, had he been given a hearing, might have urged that the philosopher had not the requisite sensibility for appreciating sensual pleasures at their full value, and that, as susceptibilities differ, each party should be left the judge of what he likes best. There is no good reply to this rejoinder, so far as regards the intensity of human feelings. But on the question of permanence, the philosopher does seem to stand on firmer ground. Sensual susceptibilities, however carefully nourished, change and wither as the organic life passes youth and maturity; there is far less diminution of the susceptibility to the values commonly called higher—those of art and letters, of science and of the affections. From the standpoint even of the individual life, they have a degree of permanence which is not shared by the values which the sensualist esteems most highly.

It follows that there is a certain superiority in this respect of one kind of values over another. A value wears better the more it is independent of material conditions; the higher values of knowledge, art, and morality are more permanent than those of the sensual life. The distinction remains a relative distinction, due to the greater permanence of the interests to which certain values appeal. And if, as will be argued later, all values belong to the personal life, their permanence must depend upon its permanence. This will hold even of the 'eternal values' of truth, beauty, and goodness. Indeed the phrase 'eternal values' is liable to be misunderstood. It seems used so as to signify independence of time and therefore of any conscious life which, like the human, is in time. In this sense we might predicate eternity of truth (except in so far as truth is conceived as the possession of an intelligence which functions in time), or of beauty (if we regard beauty as independent of conscious apprehension), but hardly of moral goodness (which involves a state of conscious will). But, although truth and beauty, as thus restricted, are elements in or contributory to value, we do not seem justified in calling them values apart from their realisation in or through conscious life. They are not values till realised, and as realised they can be eternal only if, and in the same sense as, persons are eternal.

There is a further distinction between values which is due to what Bentham calls their 'extent.' It relates to the number of persons who may participate in their enjoyment. To this distinction we may give the name of Catholic and Exclusive. By catholic values (as the

term is used here) I mean those in which all men may participate, or those whose enjoyment by one man does not limit or interfere with their equal enjoyment by others. When one man can enjoy a good only by its loss to other men, or by restricting their equal chances of enjoyment, then the value may be called exclusive. The great classes of value which have been mentioned —intellectual, moral, æsthetic, and emotional—have nothing in their own nature which makes them exclusive. When one man attains truth, or admires beauty, or realises goodness, or even enjoys happiness, there is nothing in his experience which makes it impossible or more difficult for others to do the same. Truth may be passed from mind to mind; beauty does not wane by being admired; goodness is infectious; even happiness radiates from the presence of the happy man, if only outward circumstances do not impose a bar. But if men regard outward or material circumstances as themselves possessed of intrinsic value, then such values, or many of them, are exclusive. The full enjoyment of material goods commonly requires their monopoly. This is most obvious in the case of primary needs—food and clothing and shelter. But it holds of material goods generally that their supply is limited, while desire is boundless. And the industrial civilisation in the midst of which we live has as yet done little to reduce or to counteract the conflict of interests which lies at its base.

If we admit that material goods have instrumental value only, a further consideration enters. Intrinsic goods have varying degrees of connexion with or dependence upon the material apparatus that may be instrumental towards them. The closer this connexion

is, the greater this dependence, the more difficult will it be for such goods to be realised by many persons, and the greater will be the antagonism between the interests of one man and the interests of another. On the other hand, the less its dependence on material instruments, the more catholic is any value. It is thus interesting to compare the different degrees of this dependence in the different classes of value.

Happiness has an obvious connexion with such external instruments, though it is not easy to state the connexion in a way free from objection. Wealth and, in general, the control of the material environment are so constant an object of desire that men are apt to forget that happiness consists in a state of mind and not in the possession of material goods. But it is not altogether independent of these possessions. Nor is there any common standard for determining what that competent measure of external goods is which, in Aristotle's view[1], is necessary to happiness: nor, indeed, any ground for assuming that the competent measure is the same for all men. Nor can any general agreement be found amongst the long line of reflective writers who have given their opinions on this subject to the world. On the one hand it has been common to emphasise the inward nature of happiness and to minimise its dependence on anything outside a man's own mind. Thus we have Adam Smith[2], economist as he was, depreciating power and riches as "enormous and operose machines," which "keep off the summer shower not the winter storm," and asserting that "in ease of body and peace of mind

[1] *Ethics*, book I, chap. x, p. 1101 a 15.

[2] *Moral Sentiments*, part IV, chap. i.

all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for." On the other hand a shrewd observer has roundly asserted that threefourths of a man's happiness depend upon his yearly income[1]. And this, put more graphically and with insight into the fact that it is not only income, but being within your income, that matters, was the simple philosophy of Mr Micawber: "Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery." In truth, the conception happiness conveys so little regarding its content or conditions that the controversy hardly admits of a more definite decision than this: that so far as a man's happiness depends on external circumstances it will frequently tend to come into competition with the similar happiness of other men.

This is the general rule; and it applies to other values as well. Knowledge is the same for all, and there is nothing in the nature of truth to make it the property of one man rather than another: except this, that, before it can be attained, it may require a concentration of mind and a culture of the intellect which are only possible to those who have not only a fit endowment of mental faculty but also some amount of freedom from the ordinary cares of life and leisure to devote themselves to intellectual pursuits. And civilisation has not yet managed to produce a society in which this leisure is

[1] I cannot trace the reference, but my recollection is that the assertion occurs in one of Prof. Bain's works.

open to all. Those who have it are in a position of privilege to which only a limited number can attain.

Much the same must be said of the æsthetic values. It is true that in itself beauty is as little envious as any good. It is not made less beautiful by being shared. But it is rarer than we could wish, and to enjoy it the intervention of material instruments is necessary. Many of the beauties of nature, most of the beauties of art, are as much hidden from the mass of men as are the intellectual delights of the mathematician. They need opportunities for their inspection and culture for their appreciation. They are thus, like the intellectual values, limited by external conditions which the social order has not been able to put within the power of all but reserves for those who are favoured by economic circumstances.

Moral values are not limited in this way. It is, of course, true that every kind of moral activity is not open to every one, and that circumstances call for different modes of conduct. The particular good deed of one man may make it impossible or unnecessary for another man to perform the same good deed; but it never puts goodness out of his power, it never interferes with his volition to do the best. Whatever the circumstances there is always a right to be done, a moral value to be realised. The attainment of moral value by one man may act as a stimulus in the same direction upon other men, just as his cultivation of truth or beauty may. But in the latter cases the stimulus may lead to impotent desire—for the instruments of study or of art may be wanting. In morality, on the other hand, there is no such monopoly of means, for the moral law is realised

by the will alone, and through the will it is manifested in character. Riches and poverty, health and sickness, power and subjection are merely different conditions in which goodness can be cultivated and moral values brought into existence. This universality of the moral value vindicates its rank as the purest and most catholic among the varieties of value.

Yet another ground of distinction may be mentioned. Values may be divided into higher and lower according to the degree of their importance; and within the higher class we may speak of dominant values.

This distinction concerns intrinsic values only. It is clear that instrumental values must be measured by the intrinsic values to which they lead and by their effectiveness in leading to them. But, as soon as the question is put regarding the relative importance of intrinsic values, the difficulties that lie in the way of any solution are apparent. If intellectual values are under consideration, are we to prefer mathematics to biology, economics to metaphysics, or the reverse? If the question is æsthetic, can we say which art is the highest and by how much? Or, in morality, can we distinguish kinds of goodness and arrange them in the order of their value (as Reid attempted to arrange the virtues, or as Martineau classified springs of action according to the degree of their moral worth)? And if happiness be the aim, is it the happiness that depends on the life of sense that comes highest, or that derived from science, or from art, or from good works? Thus we raise old difficulties over again. Can we even arrange, in any order of merit, the fundamental classes of value—intellectual,

artistic, moral, and emotional? These questions appear unanswerable, and we are tempted to put them aside, and to say that value is value, and there is an end of the matter—that it has no degrees. But if we do take this line, we are confronted with the fact that we are constantly compelled, whether on good grounds or on bad, to make some preference of the kind described—to select one value rather than another when the attainment of both is impossible but a choice between them is open to us.

There are two ways in which the comparative valuation of values may be attempted. One of these is empirical and quantitative. It starts from the assumption that each value has a definite quantity of something which we must just call value and which is always the same in kind, so that all values can be measured by the quantity of it which they contain, and so receive a definite position on the one scale of values. This done, the whole difficulty vanishes; this said (it seems to be thought), all theoretical difficulties disappear and only practical difficulties remain. The issue is not so plain as this, however. A scale of values of this kind has been worked out on one hypothesis only—the hypothesis that, in the last analysis, positive value belongs to pleasure only and negative value belongs to pain only. I cannot in this place examine once more the famous hedonic calculus, and must content myself with assuming that it has been unable to justify itself at the bar of criticism. Other suggestions for a quantitative estimate and single scale of values have still to answer the question as to the nature of the ultimate something called value which in some instances appears as sensuous, in

others as intellectual, in others as moral, in others as artistic, and so on, but which is supposed to maintain an identical nature under these different forms.

If we are to compare values at all, we must give up the idea of a scale for that of a system. We shall never get what we want by adding and subtracting quantities. Even if a quantitative process of this sort enters into the estimate, it will only be in the same way as mechanical interactions enter into vital mental and social processes. It will not give us the clue. The clue will have to be sought in the idea of a system to which the values belong. Now the subject of values—that is, the conscious person—when he tries to rationalise his life, does attempt also to systematise his values: partly deliberately, partly unconsciously, he gradually forms a dominating conception which determines his conduct and his view of what is of greatest worth. Under this dominant conception, he will arrange other conceptions contributory to value in his life, and will negative suggestions which interfere with that value. To take an example: gratitude will be approved as a dispositional attitude; but some particular instance of gratitude may be inconsistent with the whole system of social order, so that this particular act of gratitude (say, perjury for a benefactor's sake) ought not to be done. Throughout we are concerned not so much with a total worth to be got by adding particulars, as with the worth of a totality.

We are familiar with many dominant conceptions of value which appeal to the judgments of different men. The voluptuary, the artist, the moralist, the sage, the saint, has each his own dominant conception of value. A complete theory of value should be able to determine

the relative validity of these conceptions; and this would involve two things. In the first place it would be necessary to make clear the universal conditions of value which are valid irrespective of the time place and circumstances of the persons in and by whom value is to be realised. In the second place these general principles should be shown to be consistent with, and to make possible, different types of value corresponding to differences of endowment and opportunity. There is one dominant value for the artist's life, another for the statesman's, another for the philosopher's. Each pursues his own line of life, and his standard differs from the standards of the others. And yet, behind their difference of thought and of achievement, there may be an identity of principle. There is diversity of gifts, but each gift is the earnest of a realised ideal; there is diversity of ideals, but each ideal is worthy; "wisdom is justified of all her children." All men, in their various ways, may be guided by the same principle, each seeking to make his life perfect by the highest performance in his power. To determine the way in which different ideals are related to one another in a community of lives that seek the highest value is not an initial problem. Rather is it the crowning work of an ethical theory. Yet, short of this, we shall not be able to give a satisfactory solution of the problem of the scale of values. For that problem has been resolved into another—the problem of the organic unity or systematic whole into which all values enter, and by their relation to which the place and degree of all partial values are determined.

III

THE MEANING OF VALUE

At this point it is necessary to pause and consider an objection that may be taken to the line of argument upon which we are entering. We have discriminated the moral judgment and other judgments of value from the positive judgments about matters of fact and relations on which science is based, but have we any right to regard the two classes of judgment as of equal and objective validity? May it not be the case that the factor called worth is derived entirely from a subjective source —from the element of feeling or of desire which accompanies our judgment? And, if this is so, are not the whole of our value-judgments, and in particular moral judgments, without objective validity? Are they not simply an expression of feelings of pleasure or pain, or perhaps of movements of desire, on the part of the person who makes the judgment? and is their true implication anything more than this—'I am pleased,' or 'I desire'? The objection indicated in these questions takes the form of offering a psychological explanation of the moral consciousness, and generally of the consciousness of value; and this psychological explanation is then held to determine the significance of the consciousness.

The psychological explanation, it will be noticed, takes one or other of two forms. Sometimes it is the

feeling of pleasure, at other times it is the experience of desire, that is appealed to. The two methods may be reconciled by those who hold that desire is always directed to something pleasant as pleasant. But this latter doctrine must not be assumed, nor has it been uniformly held either by those who reduce the moral consciousness to pleasure-pain or by those who reduce it to desire. And both these views have been frequently held. The former has its most famous representative in Hume who defined virtue (or goodness) as "whatever mental action or quality gives to the spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation[1]"; amongst contemporaries the same doctrine was maintained by Meinong in his early work on the value-judgment[2]. On the other hand, a century before Hume, we have both Hobbes[3] and Spinoza[4] asserting that good is just a name which a man gives to whatever is the object of his desire; and, at the present day, a similar explanation is given by v. Ehrenfels[5] in his treatise on the theory of value, as well as by many other writers.

A full discussion of these views would require a long

[1] *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, app. i, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 289; *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. II, p. 261.

[2] *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-theorie* (1894), p. 73. This passage, he said afterwards ('Ueber Werthaltung und Wert,' *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. I (1895), p. 328), "was intended to imply that an object has greater value for me according as the consciousness of its existence excites in me a more lively feeling of pleasure"—a view which he finds on reflexion to disagree with the facts of experience.

[3] *Leviathan*, part I, chap. vi, p. 24.

[4] *Ethica*, iii, 9 schol.

[5] *System der Werttheorie* (1897), vol. I, p. 2.

psychological enquiry, and my purpose is not psychological. Nothing further can be attempted here than to fix attention on one or two salient points specially connected with the ethical implications of the psychological explanations. If we say that the approval of goodness is simply one kind of pleasure, and that both its force and its validity depend on the degree of that pleasure, then our assertion will have a very immediate and radical bearing on ethics. The same will be the case if we assert that good is just the name we give to an object of desire, and that goodness must therefore be measured by the strength of the desire. These assertions would undoubtedly lead to a fundamental modification, or rather to a complete reversal, of ethical values. And, if any writers make them, it will not be unreasonable to say of them, as Hume said of the controversialists who denied the reality of moral distinctions, that they "may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants[1]." For such assertions would overlook the elementary facts which we have to explain. Even if the primary basis on which moral apprehension depends is a feeling of pleasure, it is discriminated from other feelings of pleasure. Stolen fruits may be sweet and pleasant in their sweetness; but the pleasure got from them is not a moral pleasure; the moral fact enters only when the stolen fruit, though sweet and pleasant to the taste, is also a source of conscientious pain; and it is this moral pain which needs explanation. In the same way all that we desire may be called good by us; but the moral judgment is a discrimination between good and bad desires, and it is

[1] *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. i, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 169; *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. II, p. 169.

this discrimination which we have to account for. It is only a special kind of pleasures, therefore, or pleasures got from some special source, that can be identified with moral approval. On the other view, it is only certain desires, or desires for certain classes of objects, that can correctly be called good.

Both views of the moral consciousness to which I am referring—both the view which explains it by reference to pleasure and that which explains it by reference to desire—must recognise, and, in general, do recognise the fact that calls for explanation. In all moral experience there is something which cannot be simply identified with pleasure or with desire, but contains a differentiating factor which makes it moral and not merely pleasant or desired. This recognised, the purpose of the psychological moralists is perfectly legitimate. The moral consciousness is a comparatively late expression, if not of human life, yet of life generally; it appears subsequently to pleasure and subsequently to the active or impulsive consciousness. It is legitimate to try to get at an historical understanding of it by connecting it causally with one or other or both of these antecedent and more primitive experiences. Accordingly, the proper purpose of both views is to discover and trace a line of causal connexion; their success in this attempt is a strictly psychological question; the bearing of their results upon the significance of the moral consciousness is a further question. It is this further question that interests us; but, perhaps unfortunately, it cannot be understood properly without reference to the method of procedure adopted for the solution of the psychological problem; and as two different methods

for this solution have issued in the objection that has given us pause, it will be necessary to take notice of both these methods.

Let us take first the mode of explanation which depends upon the pleasure-pain factor in experience. Moral approbation, according to Hume, is a "pleasing sentiment." But not every pleasing sentiment has the function or nature of moral approbation. The divergence between pleasant feeling and moral approval is indeed so marked that pleasure is often regarded with suspicion by the moralist, and in matters of moral decision which require delicate discrimination, we must lend ear to Aristotle's advice[1] to beware of the side that leans towards pleasure. Moral approbation, therefore, must be a certain kind of pleasing sentiment, or pleasing sentiment derived from a certain source. And this is recognised by Hume. According to him and many others sympathy is the source of this special sentiment. That is to say, not any pleasing sentiment is equivalent to moral approbation, but only the pleasing sentiment due to sympathy. Or rather (since even this is too wide), the pleasing sentiment of sympathy, when sympathy is defined and limited in certain ways which, for present purposes, do not need to be more particularly characterised. Sympathy was taken by Hume[2] to be a sentiment which "nature has made universal in the whole species," and which did not admit of further derivation. Both later and earlier psychological moralists

[1] *Ethics*, book II, chap. ix, p. 1109 b 8.

[2] *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. i and app. i, ed. Selby-Bigge, pp. 173, 286; *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. II, pp. 172, 259.

have parted company with him at this point, and held that we can trace the genesis of the feeling of sympathy by means of the working of mental association. If this latter view be adopted, we shall have to postulate only the more simple and immediate pleasures such as those of the senses, and we shall then be able to trace the way in which, by the working of the ordinary laws of association, pleasure comes to be connected with our representation of the states of mind of others, and sympathy as a 'pleasing sentiment' arises. I do not propose to examine the correctness of this psychological derivation. But it may be said, in passing, that Hume and Adam Smith showed a true instinct for essentials in laying great stress on sympathy—the emotional side of the social factor—in morality, though I think that they erred in laying exclusive stress upon it.

Let us assume then the correctness of the historical account of the genesis of this pleasing sentiment of moral approbation. We must now ask the question, What is the validity of this moral approbation or approval? How are we to measure or otherwise appraise it? Must we do so simply by going back to its origin? If so, then we must remember that its origin (according to the more radical psychologists) is simply pleasure, indeed, sensuous pleasure. And, if we are presented with an experience in which (as we may put it) sensuous pleasure points one way and the pleasure of moral approbation the other way, then all we can do is to compare the two pleasures as pleasures, and the only reasonable course would seem to be to give the preference to the stronger or greater, for we have taken away any other standard. If this solution were adopted, moral judgment

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would not merely be transformed, it would disappear. But this is not the solution adopted by the psychological moralists to whom I have referred. Explicitly or tacitly they give a preference to the pleasing sentiment of approbation, even although the simultaneous and competing source of pleasure which points in a different direction may be very much stronger. The preference, accordingly, is not due to the strength of the pleasure accompanying approval (for Hutcheson's view[1] that the pleasures of the moral sense are the greatest pleasures we have may be set aside as inconsistent with facts); it must therefore be due to its source—in this case, sympathy as against egoistic feeling. That is to say, we are assigning validity to, or rather assuming the validity of, the social factor which enters into our moral consciousness, when it is opposed by selfish pleasure or interests. If so, the attempt to trace the historical genesis of that factor has had no effect upon its significance for life or upon the validity of our moral judgment. Historically, we suppose that we have traced social feeling back to its origin in egoistic feeling; but, in our ethical estimate, we do not express the value of the one in terms of the value of the other.

Perhaps Herbert Spencer may have had this point in view when he placed origin and value in inverse relation to one another by asserting that "the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts have all along been of higher authority" than the relatively primitive and simple tendencies[2]. His view is certainly

[1] *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections* (1728), p. xix.

[2] H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 106.

nearer the truth than the opposite preference of the primitive to the developed; but it assumes too easily that value increases at each step in evolution, and it makes too prominent certain formal characteristics of the evolutionary process. When the conception of temporal advance in the evolutionary process is confused or identified with the conception good or better—as often happens in Spencer—this error is fundamental. It makes time the test of goodness, and thus (though taking an opposite direction) falls into the same mistake as the view which tries to discover value by tracing psychological genesis. The latter view seeks to explain value by priority in time; Spencer's doctrine identifies it with the later moments of time. Both overlook the truth that mere time contains no element of value, and that the relation of value to the time-process is a question for investigation not for assumption.

When we turn to the view that the appreciation of moral value is a product of desire—that we approve what we desire—the argument must follow similar lines, although this view perhaps goes deeper than the other. According to the former view we approve what pleases us, or the approval is the same thing as the pleasure; according to this view we approve what we desire: approval does not bring desire after it, but on the contrary, desire determines approval or is the same thing as approval. This theory lays stress on the active process of life as the fundamental factor in man's consciousness; and, in this, it is distinguished from the preceding theory which emphasises the passive feeling of pleasure. But the two theories are alike in

trying to explain moral approval by resolving it into something else; and their methods in large measure correspond. Just as we saw that, if to approve means simply to be pleased, moral distinctions will disappear or be transformed, because morality requires discrimination between things that please, so if good means simply what we desire, then, equally, the concept becomes otiose or must change its meaning: the problem is not touched regarding the approval of one desire (not always the strongest desire) and the disapproval of others.

But those thinkers who derive approval from desire seldom rest in this conclusion. They attempt to discriminate between desires, and to make a psychological account of the development and systematisation of desires serve the purpose of this discrimination. From this discrimination, in some way or other, the moral approval of one desire and the moral disapproval of another come into being. Here, again, the psychological problem is legitimate; and there can be no question that the moral approval which discriminates between desires is a later product in consciousness than desire itself. We may say that desire is antecedent, morality consequent. But it does not follow that the moral factor can be accounted for by the factor of desire; still less does it follow that the latter is the measure of the significance or validity of the former.

There are factors in the inherited constitution, factors of the nature of instinct, which predetermine the strength and order of the impulses before the appearance of the ideal factor which transforms impulse into desire. A certain though limited measure of order

is thus to be expected in the life of desire even independently of morality; the desires tend to be directed to certain objects or classes of objects, and they vary in strength. Reflecting upon them we may group them in certain ways. We may distinguish, for instance, transient desires for objects from those which are connected with the permanent needs of life, and among the latter we may distinguish those which are mainly egoistic in their interest from those whose interest is mainly racial or social. But how are we to assess their relative values? The strength of the desire cannot supply the place of a standard; for, indeed, strength and value are often opposed: the sensuous interest overpowers the spiritual, the immediate the permanent, the selfish the social. The utility of moral ideas (if the phrase may be allowed) consists in this that they introduce a new standard, a standard of value, by which the standard of strength may be regulated and controlled. They give a preference, as we may put it, to certain desires over others: to the permanent over the transient, to the social over the selfish, to the spiritual over the sensual. The grounds of this preference are not got out of the mere fact of desire as a conscious active tendency varying in strength. If we say they are to be got out of the different objects to which the desires are directed, then we assign higher value to one object than to another, and our moral judgment consists in thus assigning value to the different objects of desire. It is not got out of the desires themselves, but is an appreciation of desire founded upon objective discrimination.

As in the case of pleasure, so in the case of desire,

tracing its genesis and development does not determine its validity. This determination, it may be added, becomes prominent in consciousness only by gradual stages; and it is only because every stage in the process of growth is small that it has been possible for some moral psychologists to overlook each small advance and to imagine that the whole facts of the mature moral consciousness can be accounted for by their origin. The limits of this method are made clear when we put the question, Why do we assign validity to our moral approval and to moral ideas generally? To this question the history of their genesis gives no answer.

The method of psychological enquiry is misconceived and its results are misinterpreted when these are allowed to take the place of an independent investigation of value. The experience and judgment of value are undoubtedly mental facts, and psychology may trace their rise and history; but it does not touch the question of their validity, any more than the validity of mathematical judgments is affected by the history of their formation.

Another consideration, however, of a different kind is sometimes regarded as putting ethical enquiry in the strict sense out of court, or as being itself the proper substitute for ancient methods of ethics. This consideration is derived not from the psychical history of moral judgments but from their social conditions. The moral consciousness, it is held, is simply a reflexion of the social order, or at least in origin it was so; and its peculiarities are due to its origin. From this view also there may be derived an objection at the threshold to

the validity of the judgment of value, though it is an objection of another kind than the preceding. It does not resolve value or approval into psychical elements of a different and better known order, but it traces them to the influence on consciousness of the social environment which controls and directs the individual. Value-judgments, it is held, are only an expression of what happens or of what is required socially.

The facts upon which this view depends are connected with the varying moral codes which distinguish different times and circumstances and different races, and they offer an explanation of this variety. Within a given community there is much greater uniformity of moral opinion than there is between one community and another; and the nearer we go back to primitive and simple forms of social organisation, the greater is the degree of moral uniformity within them, and often, at the same time, the more striking are the moral differences between one community and another. Each community has its customary code, and the custom of the early tribe contains everything which we now distinguish as law, morality, and custom. There is no law and no morality beyond the custom of the tribe; its members have no private consciences or independent rules of right, and nonconformity is unknown or promptly suppressed. The custom of the tribe is, accordingly, the earliest rule of right, the original moral code; the members of the tribe feel bound to conform to this custom: if they did not conform, their tribal and therewith their individual existence would be imperilled, and they would cease to count as factors in the tribal

consciousness. The judgment of approval or disapproval, which distinguishes the modern conscience, is a slow development from this implicit acknowledgement of the authority of the tribe.

In regard to this question a distinction has to be drawn similar to the distinction already drawn regarding the inferences which have been made from the psychological analysis of the moral judgment. We have to ask the question, what general conclusions are established with greater or less probability regarding the social nature of the moral judgment, and then we have to apply the answer to the very different question of the significance of that judgment. Now, it has been established, with a fair degree of probability, as a universal characteristic of human society, that groups of men everywhere are in the way of distinguishing between right and wrong, and that, in early societies, the things they call right are identical with the customary actions of the community, the things they call wrong being in conflict with these customary actions. That is to say, the content of morality, for men at the early or tribal stage of development, is identical with the content of tribal custom. But there remains an important difference which may be described as a difference of form. The custom of acting in a given way, which is displayed by members of the tribe generally, is one thing, and not the same thing as the recognition on the part of any individual that that way of acting is a rule binding upon himself. Customary action is performed by the individual even when impulse or desire points in another direction; and this performance is possible only because the custom of the tribe is recognised as a rule

binding upon him. This is the beginning of the consciousness of moral obligation. The obligation belongs in the first instance only to the content of custom; but it has potential application of a wider kind. If it had not, moral progress would have been impossible; there would never have been any morality distinct from custom. It is because men have looked upon custom as binding that they can proceed to criticise it and come to think of a different standard for morality. The theory that morality consists in nothing more than conforming to the social order, or maintaining the social equilibrium, or promoting social vitality, receives no support from the historical view that, for the conscience of the early or savage tribesman, morality and social custom had the same content.

It is, moreover, surprising to find the theory that reduces morality to sociality combined, as it often is, with a practical protest against the conventional morality of the ordinary man of the present day. For conventional morality simply means the morality of ordinary opinion, which is in close accordance with prevailing practice. The morality of primitive man was strictly conventional; the morality of civilised men is often conventional in a less strict sense (there being always some recognition of the difference between opinion and practice); and conventional morality may be used as a term of reproach just because the moral opinion of men is no longer restricted to opinions that are exclusively social in their origin. But the form of morality which is most purely conventional is that in which it is merely social; in objecting to any moral doctrine on the ground that it is conventional, the objector admits by implication

that the social basis of morality is inadequate and that it stands in need of reflective criticism.

Morality is not something that has descended out of heaven in perfect and final form. Like everything else that exists it is a development, the successive stages of which admit of being traced historically. By morality we mean the conduct character and ideas of men in their relation to goodness; and these have grown in precision and in system with the growth of the human mind and the changes of its environment. If a man or a race of men have thought that something is good, then it is a truth—an eternal truth—that they so thought; but it is not therefore an eternal truth, or true at all, that the thing they thought good was good either then or at any time—only that it seemed so to them. The same holds of other values. Men have thought certain things beautiful; and that they so admired them or held them as beautiful is true, though their appreciation may have been defective, and it does not follow that what they admired as beautiful was really beautiful. At each stage of historical development, the meaning of the moral judgment is 'this is good,' and the meaning of the æsthetic judgment is 'this is beautiful.' This meaning may, indeed, be mistaken or erroneous in any given case. But the assumption of the value-judgment is always that there is a value which may be predicated of this or the other situation. And the significance of the historical evolution of moral opinion depends on this assumption. Were the assumption invalid then the proposition 'this is good' could never be either true or false. It would only express

some peculiar state of mind of the person making the assertion and would have no possible validity in itself —would be, indeed, simply an emotion put by mistake into the form of a proposition[1].

As a fact of the mental life, the moral idea makes its appearance in the midst of emotional and impulsive experiences; but it is not itself either a feeling or a striving. Rather it is a selective principle which functions as a guide to striving and which may determine as well as be determined by feeling. Feeling and striving are indeed anterior to moral ideas and moral judgment; and the moral order in the mind of man, being later in time, may be described as having arisen out of mental phenomena which were as yet non-moral. In exactly the same way there were sensation-factors in consciousness before there were any judgments of perception—anything that can be called knowledge; and, as sensation is in this way prior to knowledge, it is possible to hold with the empirical philosophers that knowledge arises out of, or even is derived from, sensation. The mode of transition from sensation to judgment is a problem for the psychologist; but, whatever solution may be found for this problem, the fact remains that, once we have a judgment, we have before us a question which concerns not the sensations of a subject but the nature of an object. Similarly, whatever be the mode of transition from feeling and striving to the moral judgment, once the transition is made we are no longer concerned with subjective emotions but with the validity of the assertion that this or that is good.

[1] As Westermarck thinks, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. 1, p. 17.

Morality begins with judgments about good and evil, right and wrong, and not simply with emotions—retributive, parental, sympathetic, or what not. Always there are moral judgments as well as moral emotions wherever men are found. What lies behind or before these judgments is matter of speculative, though perfectly legitimate, hypothesis only. The moral judgment is, in this respect, on the same level as the positive judgment of experience. We may enquire into the psychological antecedents of the process of judging. But if we may assume that judgments are either true or false—and this assumption is necessary in all scientific enquiry—then the antecedents of the moral judgment do not invalidate its claim to truth any more than the antecedents of judgments of experience invalidate the same claim on their part.

Reflexions of the same kind apply to the assertion of the social origin of morality. Habits and a certain order in social conduct are anterior to the moral order, as may be seen from the behaviour and grouping of animals; and the moral order which expresses moral ideas, being later in the time of its appearance, may be described as having arisen out of a non-moral and merely biological order. But it does not follow from this that the moral order is merely a more complex stage of the biological; for it expresses ideas which are foreign to the latter. Morality is related to society much in the same way as science is. If morality is a social product so also is science; and this feature does not affect the validity of the one any more than it affects the validity of the other. The grounds for the assertion are the same in the two cases. When we say that morality is a

social product we mean, first and chiefly, that the individual mind left to itself would not have risen to the conception of moral good and evil. But the reason of this limitation does not lie in anything peculiar to the content of good and evil. It is not simply because good and evil are social factors that the limitation holds true. Even if we abstracted altogether from the social content of morality something would remain; something does remain for the ordinary moral consciousness in the relative values of different personal desires or volitional systems. The individual is a system within himself, and the competition and coöperation of his own volitional tendencies provide material for the systematisation of character, for preference of one tendency to another, for moral judgment therefore. Accordingly, were man conceivable as a solitary being, he would in his own life provide the material and opportunity for moral judgment, although, as a matter of fact, he might be incapable of making such judgments. There would remain something, not to be identified with the social life, as the content of morality.

It is not therefore simply owing to its predominantly social content that morality would be impossible for the mere individual. It is rather because the mere individual would not possess the intellectual characteristics of a self-conscious person. His consciousness of self has been developed and defined only in connexion with his consciousness of other selves; apart from this social consciousness he would not think of himself as a person —he would have no consciousness of self. His experience generally owes its precision and importance to the fact that it can be shared by other observers, and

his truths are recognised as valid because they appeal to others in the same way as to himself. Further, the language in which he expresses his judgments and by means of which he has been able to rise to conceptual knowledge is a social formation, received by him from the social environment and the historical traditions into which he has entered. Apart from all these social influences, the theoretical knowledge of the individual could be as scanty, or rather as non-existent, as his knowledge of morality.

We cannot, therefore, make the social, any more than the psychical, origin of morality an objection to its validity, unless we are prepared at the same time to allow that the social origin of science is an objection to its validity. The exact sense in which moral judgments have objective validity, and their relation in this respect to scientific propositions, is a question that remains to be discussed. For the moment it is sufficient to have obviated the objection taken at the threshold to the objectivity of value on the ground of the psychological or historical origin of the judgments of value or because human intercourse is a necessary condition of their formation.

So far we have been occupied in defending the objective character of judgments of value. Their meaning is not that the subject desires a certain object or is pleased with it, any more than the judgment of sense-perception means that he has certain sensations. It is possible that it may be by means of conative or affective experience that we arrive at a judgment of value, just as experience in the way of sensation leads to the judgment

of sense-perception. But in neither case does the origin constitute the meaning of the judgment. In both cases there is a reference to something beyond the mental state of the subject—to a value which he appreciates or to an object which he perceives. The argument has been restricted to the typical case of the moral judgment, for it is with morality that we shall be mainly concerned in the sequel, and it is unnecessary to extend the discussion to the other classes of judgments of value.

The defence of its objectivity brings the appreciation of worth or value into touch with that description of the relations and qualities of things which is given by scientific judgments. And the question accordingly arises whether there is, after all, any fundamental distinction between the attitudes of appreciation and description, and whether the judgment of value is not simply the recognition of a relation between existing things, with which science is not concerned, or of an additional quality which they may possess. The view which has been examined in the preceding paragraphs is indeed one way—and perhaps the most thorough-going way—of identifying the judgment of value with a judgment of existence, or of reducing 'ought' to 'is.' On that view the value predicated in the judgment not only arises out of, but can be reduced to, the mode of valuation ; it consists in the relation which some content presented to a subject has to that subject's sensibility, thus producing pleasure, or to some desire or system of conative tendencies of the subject, to which it promises satisfaction. That view, accordingly, would explain value as a relation to the subject; but it has already been shown

to be founded upon a confusion between the process by means of which we become aware of value and the value itself of which we become aware.

Different features are presented by the type of view which explains the meaning of value by resolving it into some kind of objective relation of things. Explanations of this sort are familiar. For instance, we may approve a certain distribution of wealth between the persons engaged in its production, and give as a reason for our approval that the distribution is fair or that it realises justice; we may say that its value consists just in this fairness or justice, and we may at the same time identify this fairness or justice with a certain objective relation between labour expended and remuneration received. Or again, we may admire a work of art, and hold that its value consists in its beauty and that this beauty can be analysed into certain relations between its component parts. Thus, in these and other cases, the value may appear to consist in relations which actually hold of certain objects. But it does so only because we identify value with the object valued. We would not approve the given economic distribution were it not for the fairness of it or those relations in which that fairness consists; we would not admire the work of art were it not for the harmony it displays or the relations in which that harmony consists. So far the analysis is correct. But the appeal to objective relations only shows that they are the ground of our attributing value to the object; not that they are themselves this value. Justice or fairness may consist in certain objective relations; but the value ascribed to justice is an added predicate over and above these relations. Harmony in the same

way may consist in certain objective relations of colour or of tone; but the value of harmony does not consist in these relations; it is a further predicate which characterises their presence.

Seeing that value cannot be reduced to a relation between objects shall we then say that it is a quality of an object much in the same way as its shape and colour are qualities of a material thing? We certainly use the same forms of speech in both cases. We speak of a good man or a beautiful statue just as we do of a yellow orange; and we say the man is good or the statue is beautiful as we say the orange is yellow and round. The mode of predication is the same; but there is at least a *prima facie* difference in the way in which goodness or value belongs to an object from the inherence in a substance of the qualities which are held to make up its nature. The difference has sometimes been regarded as a difference of level—if we may call it so. As the qualities of matter have been distinguished into primary and secondary, it has been suggested that value is a third kind of quality which may be called a tertiary quality. Now, the objects to which the distinction of primary and secondary applies are all of them material things, that is, they are objects to which intrinsic value can scarcely be attributed; consequently, to talk of value as a tertiary quality does little more than set value vaguely apart from what we ordinarily call qualities. Further, when the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is regarded as of fundamental validity, it is held to consist in this that the secondary qualities are due to the subjective affection of the percipient and are not constitutive of the nature of the

thing at all: the primary qualities alone are said to be truly qualities of the objectively existing thing and the secondary to be simply mental effects caused by some modification of the primary qualities. If the tertiary qualities were to be defined in accordance with this view, then we should expect them to be one degree further removed from the nature of the object. Like the secondary qualities they would be results which that nature produces in something else, to wit, the mind which appreciates them. They would resemble the secondary qualities in their subjectivity, that is, be mental effects, only a degree more subjectified. And this would lead us back to the subjective explanation of value, which has been already examined and rejected.

Value is predicated of an object by means of the same verbal form as a quality is predicated; but there seems to be a difference in the mode of predication which is not brought out by the verbal expression. Qualities may belong not only to existing objects but also to objects which are not conceived as existing, and without any reference to their possible existence. Thus we may say that the equilateral triangle has the quality (or property) of being equiangular, just as a particular orange may have the quality yellow; and in the former case we do not need to refer to any existing triangle, or to a triangle on the hypothesis of its existence. The property belongs to the essence of the equilateral triangle, or follows from its definition, without regard to the consideration whether an equilateral triangle, or any triangle, exists or can exist. But it is not so when goodness or value is predicated. When we say love is good or has value, we mean that love is worth existing

as a living fact; when we say that a just social order is good, we mean that such a constitution is worth existing or that a social order ought to be constituted in accordance with justice. We are not engaged simply in showing what the concept love or justice implies. The mere concept unless realised in fact is neither good nor evil: it is only as so realised, or on the assumption of its realisation, that it is called either. Thus when we predicate value of anything, we pass from the mere concept or essence of the thing, with its qualities, to a bearing which this essence has upon existence: it is worth existing or ought to be[1].

Hence, if we are still inclined to speak of value or goodness as a quality of the object to which we ascribe it, we must allow that it is a quality of a quite peculiar kind. "The heavens," says Meinong[2], "are called beautiful in no other sense than that in which they are called blue." He admits one difference, however, in that the experience (*Erlebnis*) in the former case is not merely a process of apprehending an object. And this difference goes deeper than he allows. We are not simply apprehending an object when we predicate value of it; our predicate, therefore, cannot signify merely a quality of the object, for in that case it would be nothing more than a way of apprehending the object. When we say 'the sky is beautiful' or 'the man is good,' meaning by that an assertion of the worth of the beautiful sky or good man, our judgment of value is indeed *based upon* an apprehension of qualities—the colours of

[1] Cp. Urban, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. XIII (1916), pp. 449 ff.

[2] 'Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie,' *Logos*, III (1912), p. 11.

the sky or the volitional attitude of the man. But it is not merely the assertion of these qualities or of another quality in addition. When we predicate worth or value we assert or imply that the object is worth being or ought to be; and this is fully recognised by Meinong. But, if this predicate were simply a quality constituting the nature of the object, then the assertion that the object ought to be as it is would be a tautology, as Croce holds the assertion of positive value to be[1]. Or again, when we call an object bad or ugly we assert or imply that it ought not to be as it is; and if its negative value were simply one of its constitutive qualities, this assertion would be a logical contradiction, as Croce holds is always the case with the negative value-judgment[2].

The qualities of an object differ from the value-predicate in this respect that they may belong either to an existing thing or to something which does not exist although it in some sense is, but in either case they have no special bearing upon the existence of the thing of which they are predicated. With value it is not so; it has a definite bearing upon existence, and can always be stated so as to bring out this reference: the thing is worth existing, or ought to be, or to be in such-and-such a manner. And at the same time, this form distinguishes it from the descriptive propositions of natural science. It cannot be put into words without the unique notion indicated by 'worth' or 'ought' or some similar phrase. Value is not reduced to an

[1] 'Ueber die sogenannten Werturteile,' *Logos*, I (1910–11), p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 72. Cp. Urban, *Journal of Philosophy*, XIII (1916), p. 686.

existential proposition ; but the notion of value always implies a relation to existence—though a relation to which the natural sciences are indifferent. This existential reference calls for further discussion.

IV

THE CRITERIA OF MORAL VALUE

CERTAIN points have been made clear in the preceding discussion: the persistence of value-judgments in our experience; the prominence among these of the moral judgment or appreciation of good and evil; and the irreducible significance of these judgments. Their meaning is not explained by searching for their causes in the phenomena of emotion or of desire or in the history of society. The nature and significance of these judgments, and of the moral judgment in particular, require some further elucidation.

The moral judgment is not exhaustive as regards the things concerning which it is passed. The same things may be also the subjects of non-moral or positive judgments. We may say that pleasure or knowledge or justice or love is good; but, in so saying, we allow that these same things may be, and indeed always are, appropriate subjects for judgments of a different kind, which form the basis of the positive sciences. Anything which we approve or disapprove morally may also have its causes traced, its structure analysed, and in general its relations to other things investigated. The same holds of other value-judgments. Whatever is valued must have qualities which can be examined scientifically and about which causal and other assertions

can be made, just as, on the other hand, when we have discovered all that can be discovered about the causes of things, the question of their value still remains. The two orders of proposition are concerned with the same subjects, and differ only in their predicates. It is the predicate which brings out the characteristic difference of moral approval or æsthetic admiration as distinguished from scientific generalisation.

But, as we have seen, value is not separated from existence. It is even more closely connected with it than certain departments of positive science. These may deal solely with the relation of concepts—or of things which, to use an old term, now once more in common use, *subsist* only and do not *exist*. All relations of logical implication are of this order. Thus if I say that the equilateral triangle is equiangular I do not mean that those actually existing three-sided figures whose sides are exactly equal will also enclose equal angles, or that when and if anyone succeeds in constructing a figure with its three sides equal it will also have its three angles equal. These truths follow from my statement; but the statement itself is not about existing things, but about the relation of concepts or mere subsistents. The assertion is that the concept equilateral triangle implies the concept equiangular triangle—whether such a thing as an equilateral triangle have any existence or not. Can we say the same of ethical propositions? If the proposition is 'pleasure is good,' or 'knowledge is good,' or 'love is good,' is the assertion about the implication of concepts? Do I mean that the concept pleasure—though pleasure were never experienced by any sentient being—is good? or that the mere concept

knowledge is good, although knowledge had no existence, and no one ever knew anything? Or that love is good, meaning by love simply a concept which has what is called being or subsistence, but does not exist at all, and is not manifested in the emotions or character of living beings?

If we think of answering these questions in the affirmative, we have only to realise our meaning to see grounds for hesitation. Consider, for instance, the simplest of them all—pleasure; and let us assume for the moment that pleasant experience is good. But what is meant by saying that pleasure is good? It may be a perfectly legitimate general expression for the goodness that belongs to any and every actual experience of pleasure. But then it refers to actual experiences, and their goodness is not now in question. The question is this: apart from any actual or possible pleasant experience, would pleasure—the bare concept or subsistent pleasure—be good? To this the answer must be that the mere concept pleasure is neither good nor evil: and the same must be said of love or knowledge or anything else, if used to signify merely a concept and not an existing thing or experience.

When we predicate goodness or other value, it is always predicated upon the assumption or under the hypothesis of existence. The existence need not be actual or present; but it is only as existing—or if it exists—that the thing is held to be good. 'It would be good for us to be there' is as fair an example of a moral judgment as 'it is good for us to be here.' But it has also as plain a reference to existence. Only, in the latter case existence is given as actual; in the former

it is merely postulated as possible. When Kant said that there is nothing good without qualification except a good will, and at the same time admitted that perhaps a truly good will had never existed in human history, he yet postulated the good will as a possible existent whose existence, if actualised, would be good. It was to the good will conceived as actual that he attributed goodness, while he also recognised that there might be nothing in existence which could thus be called good without qualification. Without the postulate of existence, expressed or implied, actual or hypothetical, the attribution of goodness or of any value would be out of place. This existence need not be asserted; we do not need to believe in the actual existence of the object, but we must contemplate it as existing. There need not be a judgment, but there must be an assumption[1] (as it has been called) of its existence. This assumption may

[1] When I pass the judgment 'A is B' or 'A is not B,' two factors are included in my mental process: first, the mere positing of the proposition, and secondly, the belief in the statement as true. But propositions may be posited without being believed, and a term is required to describe this attitude. For this purpose Meinong has introduced the term *Annahme*, which is commonly translated 'assumption.' Assumption occupies a place intermediate between presentation and judgment (Meinong, *Ueber Annahmen*, 2nd edit., p. 6), but its expression, like the expression of a judgment, is a proposition. The *Erlebnis* or mental process in assuming will vary according to the purpose in view. The enquirer may formulate a hypothesis of which he is almost convinced and proceed to test it by experiment: this hypothesis is an assumption. Or he may state a hypothesis which he means to dispute, and draw out its consequences till he has completed a *reductio ad absurdum*: this hypothesis also is an assumption. An intermediate case is where there is little or no conviction or expectation as to where the truth lies, but each logically possible hypothesis

take various forms. It may be a mere presumption and the question of actual or only possible existence may not even be raised, as when we say 'the punctual performance of duty' is good, without considering and without needing to consider whether punctual performance of duty is an actual occurrence, or something approximately realised only, or something merely supposed to exist. On the other hand, existence may be taken as given, as when we ascribe goodness to some concrete situation or actual person; and in this case we have an implicit judgment rather than what is

is formulated in turn and tested with a view to eliciting its truth or falsehood: all these hypotheses are assumptions. Or the enquirer's interest may lie altogether outside of the question of the truth of the proposition. The mathematician, for instance, may work out a system of transcendental geometry on the assumption that space has more than three dimensions, without caring whether it has or can have, and without even raising the question. Similarly, imaginative statements, such as the record of incidents in a novel, are assumptions—unless for the author who has persuaded himself of their truth or for the reader who believes them. Assumptions may however lead to judgments. Thus the assumption of *n*-dimensional space leads to new systems of propositions: though these propositions themselves need not necessarily be believed—only their implication by the preliminary assumption. Similarly with the work of imagination: the author believes that, assuming the existence of his characters, he has described their actions—not what they actually did, for there were no such persons, but what they would have done had they existed.

Both the judgment and the assumption are expressed by the proposition; but it is possible for there to be no explicit proposition, and yet for a propositional relation, or an 'objective,' to be taken for granted. Thus Prof. Urban distinguishes from both assumption and judgment the "primary undisturbed *presumption* of reality" which is, he holds, the essential condition of any appreciation of worth (*Valuation*, p. 43).

technically called an assumption. Or the assumption may be definitely formulated without one's committing oneself to belief in it. This assumption is a hypothesis on which we proceed—whether we are going to test it by drawing out its conclusions, or whether our interest lies outside the truth of the assumption. Thus, when we say perfection is good, or a painless life would be good, or a sinless life would be good, we do not assert that, and do not need to enquire whether, the thing we call good actually exists: what we mean is that it would be good if it existed. Accordingly, the existence implied concerning the subject of the value-judgment need not be asserted or believed, but it must at least be assumed. Apart from its claim upon existence in some such way nothing is either good or evil. This conclusion points to another result of some importance. Ethics is distinguished from the natural sciences by the fact that its propositions are value-propositions and not causal propositions: it predicates value, not causation; and it is further distinguished from mathematics (and abstract science generally) because its main propositions[1] are not concerned with the logical implication of concepts. It does not predicate causation, and its propositions are therefore unlike those of natural science. They assume the existence of their subject,

[1] By its main propositions I mean those in which 'good' or some similar notion is predicated. Other ethical propositions may be concerned with the implications of concepts, such as 'where there is no property there is no injustice' and 'no government allows absolute liberty.' It was reflexion on propositions of the latter kind alone that led Locke to think it possible to "place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration" (*Essay*, book IV, chap. iii, § 18).

and this marks the difference between ethics and mathematics.

The moral consciousness is thus one aspect of the consciousness of existing reality or of something contemplated as existing. In order to be good, or for that matter in order to be evil, a thing must first of all exist. But on the other hand the ground of its goodness lies in something else than its mere existence. Existence of itself does not imply goodness nor does it imply evil. If a reason can be found for saying that a thing is good, then this reason must lie in some quality or relation of the thing; it cannot be due to its mere existence, for otherwise the distinction between good and evil would disappear. The moral order cuts across the actual order of existence as presented in sense-perception and described by science. Two things therefore hold of the subject of the moral judgment. It must exist or be assumed as existing. But it is called good not merely because it exists, but in virtue of some quality or combination of qualities which distinguish it, or some relation in which it stands to other things. Yet these qualities or relations would not be called good unless postulated as existing. The predicate good therefore divides existence (real or possible) into two classes: the things to which this predicate applies and the things to which it does not apply.

So far accordingly, that is, from the examination of the moral consciousness, no support is given to either of two opposed doctrines which are common in metaphysical ethics. One of these doctrines equates goodness with reality; but when reality is used as synonymous with or as implying existence, this doctrine

is faced by the fact that the moral consciousness distinguishes some existing things as good and others as evil. The other and opposed doctrine looks upon good as a quality which is implied by certain other qualities merely as such and irrespective of any reference to existence; this doctrine does not allow for the fact, to which equal witness is given by the moral consciousness, that goodness does not belong to any quality by itself but only on the assumption of its existence. It is not the mere concept or idea but the existence corresponding to the concept, or the realisation of the idea, that forms the subject of the moral judgment. That judgment, therefore, always involves both something assumed as existing and a universal by means of which it is approved or disapproved.

The view which has been set forth here may be illustrated by an ingenious essay in literary criticism and perhaps gain support from it. In his essay 'On the Artificial Comedy of the Last Century,' Charles Lamb defended the licentious plays of Congreve and Wycherley by arguing that the characters represented in them have no connexion with real life. "It is altogether a speculative scene of things," he said, "which has no reference whatever to the world that is...The whole is a passing pageant, where we should sit as unconcerned at the issues, for life or death, as at the battle of the frogs and mice. But, like Don Quixote, we take part against the puppets, and quite as impertinently." The comedies cannot be acted any longer, he says, because we insist on regarding the characters as real men and women instead of the puppets they are. We are unable to enjoy the play just because our

imagination is spoiled by " the exclusive and all-devouring drama of common life, where the moral point is everything." Probably Lamb did not intend his criticism to be taken too seriously. He knew that dramatic interest demands at least the illusion of reality and that mere puppets would spoil the illusion. But he wished to justify his own enjoyment in reading the plays, and he saw that, in order to keep moral interests out of the drama, it was necessary at the same time to "escape from the pressure of reality." He was seeking a moral holiday; he wished "to take an airing beyond the diocese of the strict conscience" and, "for a dream-while or so, to imagine a world with no meddling restrictions." Lamb felt—and his instinct was sound—that the moral holiday must be taken in a region as distinct from the actual world as is fairy land. "Somewhere east of Suez" is not far enough away. In our world good and evil are insistent; but outside it, among the puppets of our imagination, we may feign their absence: and indeed they are irrelevant unless the puppets are somehow regarded as human beings with human surroundings.

We become aware of existence as a particular—a here and now; from this we pass on to the idea of future existence and backwards to that of past existence; even when we imagine the existence of something without assigning definite place and date to it, this idea also is founded on a particular apprehension and distinguished from it only by the loss of its concrete determinateness. Accordingly, seeing that moral judgment proceeds on an assumption of existence, we shall

expect the system of moral values to be built up gradually upon the basis of particular appreciations. Value resides in the particular. But it does not belong to it in virtue of its mere particularity; it belongs to the realisation by the particular of a certain character. The full determination of this character would be the completion of an ethical system, or, generally, of a system of values. It has been expressed, so far as moral value is concerned, in different ways by different schools, but chiefly in two ways: sometimes by an idea of the Supreme Good, sometimes by the conception of a Universal Law or Categorical Imperative. This conception and that idea are expressions for the ultimate subject of goodness—for that character or sum of characters which (or some of which) are possessed by everything which is rightly termed good. But neither the idea of a Supreme Good nor the conception of a Universal Law is present—at any rate, explicitly present—in our ordinary moral judgments. And if we attempt to get to our primary moral judgments we find even less trace of this universal conception of the things called good.

The traditional doctrine of the Intuitional moralists was different from that expressed here. It followed the Scholastic doctrine of morality by representing the moral judgment as arrived at deductively from a general principle of morality. The particular case (it was supposed) was first of all identified as a member of a class or instance of a principle; and this class or principle was supposed to be known intuitively as good. The moral syllogism had accordingly a universal principle of morality as its major premiss; the minor premiss brought

the particular case under the general principle; and the conclusion which resulted was the moral judgment. Thus, in spite of the apparent immediateness of the moral judgment, it was represented as the conclusion of a syllogism; and this conclusion could not have been drawn unless the major premiss—attributing goodness to a universal—had been first of all recognised. In this respect Kant's doctrine resembles the Scholastic or intuitional. According to him all moral judgment is an application of the general principle that goodness belongs only to will in so far as it is determined by the conception of a law which admits of use as a universal principle. Kant does indeed avoid a difficulty which faces the traditional intuitionists—the difficulty which arises from their assumption either of some one general conception (such as happiness or perfection) or of a number of such general conceptions (such as justice, benevolence, and the like) as the ultimate subjects of goodness, independently of all experience of happiness or perfection or justice or benevolence. The difficulty for the intuitionists is that these general conceptions are themselves only formed by the experience of being happy or of seeing or doing just or benevolent actions. All these principles were rejected by Kant as material; and indeed it is clear that they are arrived at through experience and criticism of life, and cannot therefore be primary elements in the moral consciousness. The principle which he substituted for them was not open to the same objection; but, as purely formal, it encountered another difficulty, for it was unable to yield any concrete ethical content. Both attempts at a rational ethics thus failed for opposite but corresponding reasons.

The traditional intuitionism laid down concrete moral doctrines, but it arrived at these by assuming as primary concepts which are clearly gathered from experience. Kantianism avoided this error, but only to remain shut up to a purely formal doctrine which was without connexion with the content of life and thus failed to give a system of moral values. It reduced the principle of morality to the formal proposition that the good will alone is good or that goodness ought to be realised or willed[1].

The universal of morality is contained in particulars and at first concealed by them; and the moralist's problem is to elucidate the universal by reason of which these particular cases are appropriate subjects for the moral judgment. Goodness is, first of all, recognised in a concrete situation. The moral judgment is in the first instance a perceptive judgment, as Aristotle held[2]; and ethical science is based on these perceptive judgments just as natural science is based on the judgments of sense-perception. The data of ethics are accordingly the particular appreciations or judgments of good or evil passed in certain concrete situations. These are moral intuitions, in the literal sense, for they are immediate and of the nature of perception, not the results of reasoning. But they are not intuitions as understood by the Scholastic or modern moralists of the intuitional school: for they are not general propositions, and other moral truths are not derived from them by deduction. Nor have they any infallible claim to truth. In this respect they are on the same level as

[1] See below, pp. 145 ff.

[2] *Ethics*, book VI, chap. viii, p. 1142 a 27.

the judgments of sense-perception. These judgments, although natural science ultimately depends upon them, may also be mistaken. The square tower seen in the distance appears to be round; different colours seem the same in a faint light; we see the sun move across the heavens from east to west. All these are judgments of perception which further perception itself leads us to revise and amend. The illusions of the senses are corrected by the means that cause them, that is, by additional sense-perceptions, which make comparison and criticism possible. Similar mistakes and illusions may enter into our judgments of approval and disapproval, and they need to be examined and corrected in the same way. But the possibility of error does not, in one case any more than in the other, imply the impossibility of truth. It only compels an enquiry into the criteria of validity.

For this enquiry we must use an appropriate method, and the method must have regard to the data at our disposal. It would be inappropriate, for example, to imitate mathematical method, although Descartes regarded it as the only valid type of thinking. For mathematics begins with definite concepts and proceeds to elaborate the implication of one concept by another; and for this procedure moral experience does not provide us with the requisite conceptual material. All knowledge which is concerned with the data of experience must follow a different method. It has to bring the content of experience into order, consistency, and system; and this content requires to be sifted and criticised by thought. The inconsistencies in the data of moral experience make it impossible to hold that the

propositions which directly express them are always valid. On the other hand these data may not be indiscriminately rejected, for there is no other material before us. The general validity of moral experience must be accepted in order to make possible the criticism of any portion of it by the assistance of the remainder. The work of thought is to clear away contradiction within the content of morality, to find the underlying harmony, if there be such a harmony, and to construct a system. It is, in the first place, a search for principles.

The variety of moral opinion arises out of an immense number of particular judgments of good and evil. These judgments have been pronounced upon many different situations and under different conditions. The difficulty is to extract from them general principles which can be relied upon as true expressions of moral value. In confronting this difficulty we must ask whether there are any criteria of validity which can be applied to moral judgments and by which they can be tested. Certain criteria may be suggested.

1. Every moral judgment claims validity. When I assert 'this is good' or 'that is evil,' I do not mean that I experience desire or aversion, or that I have a feeling of liking or indignation. These subjective experiences may be present; but the judgment points not to a personal or subjective state of mind but to the presence of an objective value in the situation. What is implied in this objectivity? Clearly, in the first place, it implies independence of the judging subject. If my assertion 'this is good' is valid, then it is valid not for me only but for everyone. If I say 'this is good,' and another person, reflecting on the same situation, says

'this is not good,' one or other of us must be mistaken. The proposition is either true or false; it cannot be both. The validity of a moral judgment does not depend upon the person by whom the judgment is made. It is impersonal.

There is another sense in which moral value is sometimes said to be independent of the person. It is said that what is right for me to do must, if all the circumstances are the same, be right for any one else. And this also has been held to be an ethical axiom. But with this axiom—if it be such—we have at present nothing to do. So far as we are concerned an action may be right for A and wrong for B. We have as yet only asserted that the person who passes the judgment is indifferent, not that the person about whom it is passed is indifferent. The latter proposition has to do with a special application of moral value—its application to the conduct of individual persons. The former proposition is perfectly general, and is a preliminary postulate of the existence of ethics as a system of truths. There can be no ethical truth if the same proposition is valid when asserted by one man and invalid when asserted by another. If the proposition 'A is good' is true, then it is true by whomsoever and whenever it is asserted.

This postulate is inconsistent with one meaning of the favourite phrase 'the relativity of morals.' If moral judgments are simply expressions of a subjective emotion, then they are all in a sense correct, for the existence of the emotion is not denied; but they have no further validity—nor, indeed, meaning. But we have already seen reason to dismiss this view. And my postulate

contains nothing inconsistent with the development of moral ideas or with the fact that different conduct is appropriate to different circumstances, or even to different persons in the same circumstances. Customs vary indefinitely and moral opinion varies with them. There is the greatest difference, for example, between the practice and opinion of the head-hunters of Borneo on the one hand and the practice and opinion of the Society of Friends on the other. The latter condemn the actions which are the daily and admired performance of the former. The head-hunter of Borneo approves with enthusiasm what the follower of George Fox condemns and abhors. Is it possible to institute any fruitful comparison between ideas and habits so far apart? Is it not better simply to discriminate the two stages of social development and say that moral practice and opinion are relative to the social order? The Quaker condemns homicide; and this condemnation is bound up with his religious and political creed. The head-hunter follows the way of life of his tribe and conforms to its standards, without any thought of general principles. If we seek to realise a special concrete situation which the latter approves, we must put ourselves in his position, recognise the facts of his life, and allow for the social pressure that surrounds him. It is difficult for the modern to do this, from the midst of a civilised society in which peaceful living is secured, and the necessary means for that security are not obtruded on his notice. But if he is able to do this, and to apprehend the same situation as the savage, he may still say 'this is wrong' when the former says 'this is right'—the 'this' referring in both cases to the same situation. When the two

propositions have thus clearly the same subject, they cannot both be true if they contradict one another. This follows from our postulate. Did it not hold there would be no meaning in the opposition of moral opinion or in the progress of moral ideas. It is only because, in any given situation, there is always a right and a wrong method of reacting upon it, that we can explain the true nature of the relativity of morals. The phrase loses its meaning, because morality loses its meaning, if the same thing may be both right and wrong, good and evil.

2. This character of objectivity, therefore, and of the universality implied by objectivity, belongs to the moral judgment, as to other judgments. If valid as asserted by me, it is equally valid for everyone. No proposition can claim to belong to ethics unless it has this objectivity and the resulting universality. But it is a characteristic which, at the same time, brings out the mixture of truth and error in our moral judgments. They all claim validity; but they cannot all be valid, because they are not all consistent with one another. Any moral judgment which is valid must be coherent with all other valid moral judgments: at least it cannot be inconsistent with any. Freedom from contradiction, coherence, and thus possible systematisation are criteria by which the validity of any moral judgment may be tested. If any such judgment is inconsistent with some other judgment known to be valid then it cannot be valid also; if it is consistent with other valid judgments then it may be valid. And if it is capable of entering into a system of moral judgments along with them and thus harmonising with them, the probability of its validity is increased. This probability may be of various degrees. When

the judgment in question is logically implied by other judgments known to be valid, its validity is certain.

This represents and in its completeness applies to a further stage in the development of moral ideas. So far I have spoken only of the primary moral judgment whose subject is some concrete individual situation—a this or that. And, if we kept to such particular judgments, science and system would be impossible : only a multitude of judgments some of which might be esteemed valid and others invalid ; while the only opening for consistency or inconsistency would be between different persons' judgments concerning the same situation. But the moral judgment, even though it concern the particular, always implies a universal. When I say 'this is good,' it is because of some character of the 'this' that it is called good. The head-hunter may judge 'this is good' when he displays his first triumph and proves his manhood upon some member of an alien tribe. He does not reflect at all upon the ground of his approval. But, if he did reflect, he might find that what he approved in calling his deed good or right was his attainment of the standard of his fellow-tribesmen—his contribution to the union and power of a community which lived amongst enemies and must be vigilant and strong in order to survive. It is thus in virtue of a universal present in the particular that the particular is approved. The given action is held to be right because it contributes to tribal preservation or strength or unity. When a later or more civilised observer reflects upon the same incident, he looks from a different point of view and sees further. In his eyes the gain to one community has its set-off in the loss to another ; what

strengthens one tribe at the same time weakens another; the action may even be in his eyes part of a system which keeps every community which practises it in constant danger of death and with the barest minimum of the goods of life. Therefore the same situation which the tribesman welcomes as good, he calls evil. The two judgments upon the same concrete situation contradict one another. But this contradiction may not apply to the underlying grounds of the judgment, if these have been correctly analysed. These may, indeed, be largely identical and differ only in degree of comprehensiveness. The ground of the savage's judgment might be expressed in the proposition 'tribal welfare is good,' and by this would be meant the welfare of this particular tribe, which (as in this case) might imply the hurt of another. The ground of the civilised man's judgment may be 'common welfare is good,' and he will not limit common welfare to the welfare of a particular tribe. Underlying the judgment of both, is the idea of a community and of the common welfare, however differently conceived; and it is on this account that the predicate 'good' is applicable. But the judgments differ in that the community in view is narrower in the one case than in the other, while common welfare may be differently understood.

This analysis brings out two points. It shows that moral judgments, which in their first expression flatly contradict one another, may yet have an underlying principle of agreement; the moral element, when elicited from each judgment, may not show the same opposition as their first statement expressed; it may even be identical in the two cases. In the second place, the

criticism of the moral judgment reveals a universal element in its subject; the subject is not a mere 'this'; it is a 'this' of a certain determinate kind; and it is owing to its character in this respect, that is, to the universal element in it, that it is held to be good or evil. The same universal element may be the underlying ground which makes possible moral judgments regarding many different subjects. Criticism will therefore reveal the possibility of systematising moral judgments with respect to the principles which they imply.

In this way we may arrive at a degree of coherence between moral judgments far closer than any mere absence of contradiction shown by the primary judgments on different moral situations. The principles involved in these judgments may be related in a variety of ways—by the kind of objects to which they refer, by the degree of generality in which these objects are taken, and so on. If the predicates of two such judgments conflict (if in the one case the predicate is 'good' and in the other 'evil'), we investigate the principle involved in the subject of each judgment, and from the relation of the two principles, seek to understand the reason for the difference in the predicates. Systematisation will, in this way, compel us often to reject the first expression of the moral consciousness, but yet without throwing doubt upon the fundamental validity of that consciousness.

In this way system becomes a criterion of moral validity. Particular judgments which conflict with a system of judgments must themselves be judged by that system. In such a case we do not merely compare

two judgments, both of which cannot be valid and between which there is room for hesitation and no clear ground for decision. On the one side we have the weight of a systematic whole, on the other the single conflicting judgment standing alone; and the system of judgments gives a stronger claim to moral validity. If this criterion still seem unsatisfactory, we must remember that the test is the same as that by which the accuracy of sense-perception is established. What we learn to call illusions of perception are in their immediate nature simply perceptions among other perceptions; but they conflict with the systematic ordering of the perceptions which lie at the basis of our scientific generalisations; we are therefore forced to reject their claim to objective validity, and we seek a new explanation of them as illusions.

3. It is possible, however, that the issue may not be between a single judgment on one side and a system of judgments on the other: but that there may be system on both sides. This is certainly to some extent the case in morality, as it also is in science; and we must proceed to enquire whether there is any further criterion of moral validity by which we may distinguish between system and system. This further test is that of comprehensiveness. It is possible that moral judgments may admit of being grouped into a system, so that within the system there is perfect coherence, while, nevertheless, a great mass of moral judgments is left outside this system and in conflict with it, but forming a different system. In such a case of conflict between system and system we may be inclined at first to appeal to a quantitative estimate and to compare the systems

according to the number of the facts of moral experience which they are able consistently to explain; and we may give the preference to the system of greater comprehensiveness, that is, to the system which is able to explain the greater number of facts.

Rival moral systems which exemplify a conflict of this kind are not unknown. Perhaps they are most evident in the department of ethics which has to do with political affairs. Tribal custom was the original moral standard; and although moral ideas have been gradually freed from tribal limitations, the community as nation country or State remains a partial embodiment of morality. So it happens that, even when egoism is not the principle of individual morality, a political egoism often continues to be regarded as the proper standard for the State and its representatives. It is possible for such a system of ideas to endure when egoism is seen to be an immoral principle for the individual. The State has a measure of self-sufficiency which the individual entirely lacks; it might still persist if, like the Ireland of Berkeley's imagination, it were surrounded by a wall of brass sixty cubits high. Thus it happens that, in every powerful State, many thinkers share the view of Bismarck and Treitschke that the only ethical principle which is valid for the guidance of a State's activity is its own preservation and the increase of its power[1]. This principle makes it possible to systematise many moral judgments as to what is good and what is evil in political conduct. But it comes into conflict with the corresponding but opposed views of the representatives of other States. If the rulers of State A hold that

[1] Cp. H. v. Treitschke, *Politik* (1897), vol. 1, p. 100.

the only principle by which political action should be judged is the maintenance and increase of the power of that State, others, in a different country, will hold that the only principle of political ethics is the maintenance and increase of the power of State B. And the familiar conflict in political morality results.

Now, if we are to apply the test of comprehensiveness, it must be allowed to be, at any rate in the first view of it, inadequate. Neither State A nor State B can make any claim to represent a comprehensive universality of interests. One may be larger and more complexly organised than the other, and the ethical principle which it adopts may comprehend a greater number and variety of particular appreciations. In relative comprehensiveness, the principle which takes as its standard the increase of the power of State A may appear to be clearly superior to the principle whose standard is the increase of the power of State B. But this bare quantitative test fails to supply any true moral principle or any criterion between the conflicting principles.

The test of comprehensiveness will not be satisfactorily met by a process of adding up particulars, and comparing systems according to the number of such particulars which they can include. We must find a principle which will comprehend both the conflicting systems, and by explaining their opposition will justify whatever validity they possess. To revert to the example. The principle of political egoism is of value on all occasions which concern only the internal policy of a single State; but in international relations it is inadequate, not in one case only but in all, because it sets

different States in opposition to one another. This marks the limits of its validity. It is of no assistance as an ethical principle when the interests of different States conflict. Apart from this conflict we can see in it something that is not really egoism, but is the recognition of a larger and common life which has claims upon the thought and activity of its constituent members. Its underlying principle, we may say, is that of the ethical importance of the organised community and the claim of the latter upon the devotion of its members. But the principle is not vindicated when one such community oppresses another with a view to the increase of its own power. On the contrary, the principle is misunderstood or relaxed, because the still larger community of the concert of nations or of human society is sacrificed to particularist claims. The criterion of comprehensiveness is fully vindicated only when the moral principle of wider sweep has proved its claim to validity by including the narrower principle which it supplants. It is not sufficient for it to cover a greater number of particular judgments than the competing principle does; it must take up the competing principle into itself and show the measure of validity which it possesses and then explain the limits of this validity. In general, it will not be a mere contrary of the other principle, but a new principle which includes more than either because it penetrates deeper than they do. Thus the moral particularism which makes the interests of one community the supreme standard of political action cannot be supplanted by the similar particularism of another community, but only by a view of the social principle in morality and of the value which belongs to

particular communities in the social whole which is co-extensive with mankind[1].

In the preceding example we have been concerned with a conflict of ethical ideals, which was due not to difference in the nature or meaning of the ideals themselves, but to their different range of application; and a means for resolving this conflict was found in the test of comprehensiveness. Another example may serve to show that the same test will still be of value, even when the conflict is not merely about the application of ethical ideals but concerns their fundamental nature. No difference of moral opinion can be greater than that which distinguishes the two views which may be described respectively as moral materialism and moral asceticism. By materialism in morals I mean the view that the most important things are those that affect the senses and that the highest values are to be found in the satisfaction of material wants. The view is not often expressed in serious argument, but it is frequently acted upon, and to adopt it involves a complete 'transvaluation of all values' which must dismiss as illusory the ideals which have tended to spiritualise human nature. The invalidity of this doctrine does not admit of direct demonstration; it is an ultimate point of view regarding the worth of things. But we may apply to it our previous test and ask, Can it be made finally coherent without disregarding essential facts? The answer to this question hardly admits of doubt. The view could be carried out systematically only by annulling or ignoring almost all the salient facts of moral appreciation: for these express a

[1] It may be noted that the above paragraphs were written before the outbreak of the present war.

constant preference of the spiritual over the material or sensuous values.

On the other hand, the contrary doctrine of asceticism recognises the supreme importance of the spiritual values but sees in the whole material apparatus of life only obstacles to their realisation. In emphasising the values which moral materialism ignores, it condemns all the values which the latter admits. Thus this doctrine also is unable to give a coherent account of values without arbitrarily excluding certain factors. Further, in restricting all value to the spiritual factor, it falls itself into inconsistency: for the spiritual life needs the support of a material basis, the assistance of material instruments. Systems of asceticism have sometimes admitted this. But they have commonly maintained that the body and all worldly things are simply a clog to the soul and that the only worthy life is a study of death; and in this way they have adopted a conclusion which cuts away the ground for holding that there is any positive worth in the world.

The test of comprehensiveness furnishes us with a clue whereby we may penetrate beneath this conflict of views. We may admit the estimate which the ascetic doctrine puts on spiritual values, and yet, at the same time, find a place in our system of values for material goods. As spiritual activities require material instruments for their support and expression, the latter must at least have instrumental value; they cannot be merely obstacles to value; we must see in them the material through which values have to be realised, and we shall no longer be disinclined to assign them a place within the system of worth.

The criteria of universality, system, and comprehensiveness are not always capable of easy application: for our ethical knowledge, like our knowledge of causes and effects, is limited. But it may be doubted whether there is more uncertainty in the former than in the latter. In both, general knowledge is founded on particular or perceptive judgments, and the judgments of sense-perception need criticism and revision much in the same way as particular moral judgments do. Nor does the advance of science, any more than the advance of ethics, dispense with the occasional necessity for criticising and discarding preliminary generalisations. Theories which at one time seemed firmly established, such as the Ptolemaic theory in astronomy, or the atomic theory which lasted from the time of Democritus almost to the present day, have given place to other theories which include a wider sweep, and a better understanding of each portion, of experience. The progress of moral ideas shows no greater transformation.

Throughout the history of moral ideas, in spite of constant change, we may nevertheless trace a certain persistent content. In each modification the new stage is not entirely new; it brings out more fully something that was already suggested at an earlier stage. It is a permanent characteristic of the moral consciousness to find value in certain kinds of experience rather than in other kinds. At every critical turn the moral judgment pronounces for the superiority of the spiritual to the material in life, and recognises the importance of social ends when confronted by the interests or apparent interests of the self-seeking individual. The higher life

and the wider life—the life of spirit and the life for others—these the moral judgment approves with a constancy which is almost uniform. Perhaps it is entirely uniform. The valuation has indeed been rejected by individuals from time to time—as it was by Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, as it is at the present day by the followers of Nietzsche. But this rejection is not so much a different interpretation of the moral consciousness, as a revolt against morality. It is a substitution of new values for old, like the magician's offer of new lamps for old in the Arabian tale. The new lamps did not fulfil the same function as the old lamp; nor do the new values serve instead of the old. For, when we examine them, we find that they are only measurements of strength—physical standards, therefore—and not criteria of value or moral standards. In spite of the contrasts which we may discover between the ways in which different men and times express these values, their essential nature remains the same. They cannot be understood if we start by denying *in toto* the validity of the moral consciousness. And a sane criticism will find both unity of spirit and a principle of growth in its varied manifestations.

V

VALUE AND PERSONALITY

We have already seen that all judgments of value depend upon judgments or assumptions of existence. A thing does not need actual existence in order to be declared of value; but it must at least be assumed to exist. A hundred dollars—to use Kant's illustration in his criticism of the ontological argument—are of value, if they exist in the pocket but not if they are only an idea, something thought about. The proposition 'a hundred dollars are of value' means 'a hundred existing dollars are of value'; there is no value in the mere thought of a hundred dollars. The same holds when the thing of which we are speaking is of intrinsic value and not merely something of instrumental value, like the hundred dollars. Moral perfection is of value, of supreme value; but the mere concept 'moral perfection,' apart from any actual realisation of it or approximation to it, is not of value. When we examine it strictly, therefore, the proposition 'moral perfection is of value' is hypothetical—moral perfection, if realised, is valuable; or it proceeds on an assumption or presumption of existence: in so far as moral perfection is realised, just so far is there value. The predication of value thus implies or assumes something existing which can be said to possess the value; the true bearer of

value is an existing reality or something conceived as an existing reality. Were there no existence there would be no value; value out of relation to existence has no meaning.

Thus, on analysis, we find that the subject or bearer of value is always something which we describe by a concrete term and not by an abstract term. If a general term is used, as when we say, 'money has value' or 'love has value,' the general term denotes a class of objects: actual coin, for instance, or all those actually and possibly existing states of conscious experience to which we refer when we use the term 'love.' That to which we ascribe value is accordingly a singular or group of singulars—an individual being or a combination or series of things which exists or is contemplated as possibly existing.

This does not make the determination of value possible apart from universals. Universals, as we have seen, are required in order to understand the nature of the individual things in which we are interested in the quest for value. There are also, in the theory of value itself, many propositions of purely universal import. The distinction of the various kinds of value, and of the relations of values to one another, when combined or opposed, may all be set forth in universal propositions; and they may make up a formal theory of value, which shares the generality of scientific theory. This formal theory, by its generality, belongs to the region of abstraction. It deals with value and the relations of values apart from the things in which value is found and through which only it is realised. But we get at that value only in connexion with the individual, with

something that exists or is assumed as existing. The predicate 'good' has always an existent or possible existent for its subject. We cannot even say 'good is good.' That would be true only as a mere tautology, and of use for the purpose of emphasis only, but not of information. The mere concept 'good' is not itself good—it has no value. Accordingly it is only when our business is with the individual, and not where our interest centres in the universal, that the consideration of value enters at all. And thus we come to see how the value-conception and the whole train of thought which is connected with it are at once so insistent in our experience (which is of individuals) and yet alien to the procedure and ideas of the physical sciences (which deal with universals).

Our intellectual interests fall into two distinct classes according as they are centred in the universal or in the individual. In the whole region of what is commonly called the sciences the interest in the universal is supreme[1]. What we are in search of is general principles or general laws. The ideal of all the sciences is a statement in the form of a mathematical equation, perfectly general in its expression. Things are 'explained' when they can be expressed by this formula; and individual things are treated as examples of the general principle. The scientific interest in the individual processes of nature or of the laboratory is to find the law of their action; and this law is a universal which covers equally an indefinite number of processes. No one of these processes interests us on its own account so long as we

[1] Cp. H. Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 2nd edit. (1910).

keep to the point of view of the physical and natural sciences. Any one process is as interesting as any other, and its interest depends upon the general principle which it illustrates. The fall of an apple and the orbit of the earth are illustrations of the law of gravitation ; and as such are of equal interest from the point of view of natural science. Here nothing is unique ; repetition shows the law which we aim at formulating. Things and processes are not regarded as individuals or as interesting for their individuality—for what distinguishes them from everything else—but for what they have in common with other things or processes. The uniformity of nature is the supreme principle, and individuals are but examples which prove the law or cases which illustrate its operation.

As long as we keep to this scientific interest thoughts of value do not arise. The pleasure of the quest, the splendour and havoc of the earth, the worth of human life, are all of them considerations which divert the understanding from the purpose of natural science and are irrelevant to its enquiry. The reason why the natural sciences ignore the whole region of values is a good and sufficient reason. Value lies outside their scope because they are concerned with the universal and not with the individual, and the latter is the home of value.

But intellectual interest is not restricted to the universal. That restriction is the characteristic of the physical and natural sciences. And there is a region of investigation where the interest terminates in the understanding of the individual. In biography it is the life of a particular human being, in history the life of a nation, or the stages in the progress of some movement. In

these cases the individual is the object of interest, and the universals which we use in the enquiry are merely means towards a true understanding of it. Without universals there would be no knowledge of the individual, just as, on the other hand, there would be no natural science unless there were individual things to suggest and to verify the enquiry for general laws. But, although we must describe the individual by means of general terms, each of which by its generality is equally and indifferently applicable to an indefinite number of other things, yet by and through these universals we seek to comprehend something which is unique, or has happened once for all. The historical person or occurrence is not regarded as a mere type or as an example of a general principle, but as something whose character as it existed there and then is matter of interest to us, and open to our understanding.

Into this historical process values may and do enter. In this respect also historical study differs from natural science ; and the difference is due to the different objects —individual and universal—to which they are directed. Neither biography nor history is intelligible without reference to the values which guided the action of individuals or of groups. The deciding feature of a career is commonly the kind of values which appeal to the subject of the career, the degrees of force with which they appeal to him, and his consistency and persistency in their pursuit. It is the same with races and nations ; the national life shows unity and purpose not so much by wealth or power being possessed by the people or equally distributed among them, as by a community of interest such that the same values appeal to all. The

object valued may be economic prosperity, or military power, or religious belief; and one value may be higher or purer in the judgment of the moralist; but whatever it is, if it is shared by the great mass of the people, they are united as a nation thereby far more than by mere purity of race or identity of language. Thus, when we are dealing with the individual or community of individuals, we ask questions which natural science rightly looks upon as irrelevant for its purposes. We ask, On what did the man set his heart? What were the national aims? What was the end or purpose of the movement? Value belongs here, whereas for scientific enquiry the universal law or principle is the only concern, and into it value does not enter.

It is therefore in the existent, the individual, that value is found, not in the general or universal. Now the individual is always unique. How this comes about is not the question: the fact is so. No event repeats another exactly; as was said of old, 'no one descends twice into the same stream.' And no two individual persons or things are quite alike in all their characters, as Leibniz demonstrated to the gentlemen of the Prussian court when he bade them seek in the gardens of Charlottenburg for two blades of grass without conspicuous differences between them. Heterogeneity in this sense is the mark of nature. Science has the problem set to it of overcoming this heterogeneity by finding general laws which hold true in spite of individual differences; and for this purpose it must disregard the peculiarities which distinguish any individual thing from every other and make it unique.

As value belongs to the existent or individual, and as the individual is unique, we tend to think of uniqueness as essential to value. In the class of instrumental values dealt with in economics, rarity contributes to the increase of value; and when any object of value is not merely rare but a unique specimen of its kind and nothing else can supply its place, its value may be indefinitely enhanced. This estimate extends to intrinsic values also as realised in persons. A man prizes his own individuality, and resents any confusion with another self. "Very nice young ladies they both are," said Admiral Croft, "I hardly know one from the other"; but the young ladies would have resented this divided praise. 'Doubles' usually feel antagonistic to one another. When he is regarded simply as one of a class, as a specimen, a man feels himself robbed of his value; and he therefore sets store by everything which gives him a character of his own and marks him off from the rest of the world. Repetition, too, is distasteful to him, because this also is a generalising of what he esteems as existing once for all. For this reason the doctrine has never been accepted gladly that life is a recurrence of cycles, and that with the completion of the great year the whole world's history and the lives of the men who make up that history will run once more the course which they have already run and are running now. Value seems to us to be lost if the 'second turn' is a mere reduplication of the first. Who, indeed, would live his life over again if everything were to be repeated exactly as it was before, and he were to gain nothing from the present adventure? When you repeat you generalise, and when you generalise you devaluate.

The heartless words "She is not the first[1]" are an excuse for evil put into the mouth of Mephistopheles.

This view represents a very common attitude of mind: an evil thing seems to lose its badness if it is common; a good is enhanced in value by the rarity of its attainment. Yet I think that the opinion is a mistaken one and that it is based upon a misunderstanding of the true ground for the individuality of value. Evil is not less evil because the like has happened before, any more than your present toothache is less painful because you had one yesterday. It is because Mephistopheles was a sophist that he tried to quiet Faust's conscience with the words "She is not the first"—only an example of a general rule. An event is not less real because there have been other similar events and we may make certain general propositions which are valid for them all. Each is yet a true individual event. We may choose to consider that or anything else as a mere example of a universal; but its individuality remains and would remain, even if there were (as there never is) some other event exactly like it. The individual is indeed unique; but it is because it is an individual, not because it differs in some points from every other thing, that it is capable of being the bearer of value. Again, it is true that a mere repetition of the present life would seem to us to take away from its value; but that is because it takes away from its meaning—or at least from the meaning which for the most part we find in it. If we have to begin all over again just to reach a point already attained, we lose this meaning, which lies

[1] Quoted in this connexion in Windelband's address 'Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft,' *Präludien*, 3rd edit., p. 374.

in the promise of an attainment in character or in ability which does not pass away with the moment; and we therefore lose value; for the value of life consists not merely in present achievement but in the fulfilment of purpose—not in mere doing or in present being, but in making something which will not be unmade, so that things will never again come to be as if the present had not been. If it were not for this view of the whole, which is always implied in our estimate of the value of life, if the value of the stretch of life which we can observe were to be estimated simply for and by itself, then this value would not be affected by the fact that somewhere and in some distant age the cycle would begin anew. It is not because our life is a once-for-all that can never be repeated, but because it is an individual life, that it possesses or can possess value. Repetition is abhorrent to us because it implies the transitoriness of attainment, the impermanence of progress, the illusoriness of the promise of perfection[1]. But, apart from this, things and persons do not lose in value because their like may be found elsewhere or at other times. Given existence, value is always possible; it attaches itself to uniqueness only because it is the individual that exists and the individual is always unique.

So far, the result is that value does not belong to a mere quality or relation or any other universal. A quality or relation or some other universal may be a condition of the presence of value; but value postulates the existence of something valuable. We must now go

[1] Cp. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 182.

on to ask the question, Among the class of existents what members are or may be the bearers of value?

In order to decide this question, it will not be necessary to go much beyond the obvious and *prima facie* distinction of existing beings. On the one hand there are mere things; on the other hand persons. Perhaps both do not exist in the same way; but it is enough that both are there, the objects of reflexion and possible claimants of value. Nor is the classification exhaustive. It does not ask how we are to deal with the existence of human societies. And it says nothing of the whole animate world apart from man, which cannot rightly be grouped with the inorganic realm as mere things, nor yet assumed to share the personality of man. This intermediate region causes difficulties of its own, when we come to assign values; indeed, difficulty rather than safety always lies in the intermediate; and that difficulty can only be overcome by first understanding what holds true of the extremes.

Does value then belong to the mere thing, that is, to things which are not persons? To this question the first answer of common sense is that it does. The interest of the world seems to consist just in the varying values of the things which it comprises. Some things are beautiful, others ugly, some things good, others evil; and it is for us to make selection between them, and by our activity to add to the goodness and beauty of the world. But when we examine more closely this first answer of common sense, we see that the values which it finds in mere things are—at any rate the great mass of them are—merely instrumental values. What we call the 'goods' of the world are

appraised in relation to persons—by ministering to their desires, furthering their ideals, or offering scope for their activities. The fruits of the earth are called good if they nourish man or satisfy any human wants; the forces of nature, the arrangement and order of the world, are valued for their effects on the lives of persons —for the personal and social qualities and conditions which they encourage and foster. Man makes the world his instrument, and seeks in it the means for promoting a human good. These values, therefore, are strictly instrumental values; and instrumental values—real and necessary as they are—are not in themselves values but only instruments of value or means for its attainment. They are the conditions by which intrinsic values are realised; and these latter, it would appear, are found only in personal life.

But is it only of persons, or of things in relation to personal life, that intrinsic value can be predicated? Is it not possible for material things to have a value of their own apart from beings who are able to appreciate that value? The question could not be fully answered without asking another question, What sort of reality belongs to material things out of all relation to consciousness? and this is a question which it is not desirable to raise at the present moment. If we must content ourselves, then, with a less complete answer to the question, there may be some reason for distinguishing in this matter between the æsthetic and the ethical varieties of value. As regards the former, the question need hardly arise concerning works of art. It is true, as has been said before, that for their appreciation it is not necessary to go behind the work itself and to ask

what kind of a man the artist was or what the motive was that guided his work. But nevertheless it is as a product of mind that the statue or the picture or the poem is admired or valued; it clothes an idea in sensuous material; and, in its perfection, spirit breathes through the material. But it would be difficult to make and to defend the same statement regarding the beauties of nature. No thought of a divine artist is necessary for their appreciation. Their beauty is there for the seeing eye; and even if the eye is blind to the vision, the beauty (it may be said) remains and only needs the gift of sight on the part of the observer that it may be appreciated. So at least it has been held[1]; and, from our present point of view, little more can be done than appeal to immediate consciousness. Let us, if we can, suppose conscious factors of every kind to be absent and yet nature somehow to exist. What is that which we call its beauty, when there is no mind expressed in it and no eye to admire it? Can we say more that there would be a certain arrangement of forms and colours? We who see it admire it as beautiful, and we call some other arrangement ugly. But if mind were completely extruded would there be any ground for attributing greater worth or value to the one order than to the other? It would be of greater value, certainly, were it the expression of an informing mind or were someone there to appreciate it. But these are excluded. We bring mind upon the scene when we say that this particular order would have been worth producing or that it would be rightly admired; and, unless this can be said, the arrangements of light and shade, of colour and form,

[1] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, pp. 83 f.

are not themselves values, but only certain of the conditions which contribute to there being value.

But, whatever doubt may be felt regarding the æsthetic values, the point seems clear with regard to moral values—the values with which we are more specially concerned. Goodness—when we distinguish it from beauty and from truth—does not belong to material things, but to persons only. As Hume says in criticising the doctrine of moral relations found in Locke and developed further by Clarke and Wollaston, "Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents.... A young tree which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands in all the same relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality consisted merely in relations, would no doubt be equally criminal[1]." The inference which Hume draws is that moral quality does not belong to the object at all, but to the state of mind which the circumstances produce in the observer. Nero's action produces hatred in those who read of it; the matricidal growth of the young tree does not: hence the one action is wicked, the other is not. The explanation is insufficient; it refers to the difference of subjective re-action in the two cases, but it does not show why it is that the subject re-acts differently. The true explanation must go back to this cause, which, indeed, is not hard to find. We are affected differently because the objects are different, because in the one case we observe the operations of natural forces only and in

[1] Hume, *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, app. i, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 293; *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. II, p. 264.

the other we see the conscious and voluntary action of a person.

The widespread but unreflective application of moral predicates—of 'good' and 'bad'—to the operations of mere things is due to neglect or ignorance of this difference; and it is really a survival of the primitive animism which attributed to material things a life and mind similar to those of man. Without this support, it is seen to be without ground in the reason of things. Once the physical connexion of events is clearly apprehended, the causal judgment supplants the moral. It does not, indeed, interfere with the judgment of instrumental value, for that is strictly a causal judgment; but it puts out of court the judgment of intrinsic moral value, which only found admission before because things were not accurately distinguished from persons.

There is one case of the judgment of value, however, which remains and which applies moral predicates to things; and that is when nature as a whole is spoken of, and the optimist exclaims 'how good the world is!' or the pessimist says 'how bad!' These judgments, no doubt, often refer as much to the persons in the world as to their natural environment. But the latter is included in the judgment. The hedonist may approve the course of nature as the source of pleasures, or condemn it for the surplus of pain it brings; others, who are not given over to hedonism in their estimate of values, may applaud the order of the world as understood by the human mind or deplore the perplexities which make it unintelligible, or in other ways they may praise or disparage. Sometimes these judgments are little more than a reflexion of the subjective mood of

the observer, who describes his own attitude rather than the characteristics of reality. Yet it must be admitted that they are often more than this: the observer's gaze is turned outward not inward, and he sees the world as objectively good or bad. In so judging it, however, he is not thinking of its material aspects alone. The world to which he refers is the environment in which persons live and in which they seek a response to their desires or ideals. If it seems to respond favourably to the demands made upon it, it is called good; if, on the other hand, it seems to entail misery or to lead to confusion of thought or failure of purpose, as it does in the eyes of the pessimist, then it is called evil. In both cases the moral judgment is passed upon it because of its effect upon persons and their lives; it is because it defeats their desire for happiness, or their attainment of their ideals, that it is condemned, and because it furthers these that it is approved. In either case it is judged good or bad as an instrument towards personal ends, and the real or intrinsic goodness which it is praised for aiding, or blamed for thwarting, is the good or value of the persons whose fortunes are made or marred by this environment.

The value-judgments upon nature or the world of inanimate things are thus properly judgments of instrumental value, not judgments of intrinsic value. But their instrumental character is sometimes overlooked by optimistic writers and still more often by the pessimist. The famous indictment of the order of nature, which is found in J. S. Mill's essay on Nature, is a case in point. "Nature," he says[1], "impales men, breaks

[1] J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 29.

them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabi or a Domitian never surpassed. All this, Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice." In this judgment—and there are pages of similar moral denunciation—the reference to the happiness of persons is obvious and intentional. But to probe the causes of unhappiness or misfortune does not justify a moral condemnation of these causes if there was no purpose behind them. It is because Mill personifies nature that he allows himself to use the language of moral denunciation; or because he is arguing against the view that the order of nature is the result of an omnipotent benevolent will. The moral judgment upon nature—whether it be a judgment of approval or of disapproval—becomes appropriate when nature is contemplated as the work of a supreme being or person: and it is only when nature is thus contemplated that the judgment is in place. It is to persons, therefore, and not to mere things that the moral predicate can apply[1].

But, while the subject or bearer of value is always found to be in the last resort personality, the living conscious being and not the inanimate thing, it is

[1] Cp. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 184: "Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of *personal* worth. All other values are relative to values for, of, or in a person."

equally true that the thing may be essential for the realisation of the value of which the conscious person is capable. The world is the environment of personal life; ideals have to be realised by making it their instrument; mind must infuse itself into the mass that the goodness which it conceives may become actual.

From this point of view history in the widest sense may be looked upon as the gradual process of the spiritualisation of matter; we shall see in it the successive steps by which mind gains the lead, and things become contributory to values. At the beginning, throughout the whole course of inorganic evolution, we can trace causal connexions only; on the level where we ourselves stand we find men acting with more or less clear consciousness of ideals, finding and producing values. Of the intermediate stages—among the lower or sub-human forms of life—it is more difficult to say with certainty whether intrinsic or independent values are to be found. All degrees of life and mentality are there, short of the human. But we can form little idea of their nature. All we can do towards interpreting the behaviour of animals depends upon a comparison of that behaviour with human conduct, and then an uncertain inference by analogy. We subtract something from the life of mind as we know it, and attribute the remainder, or aspects of it, to the different species of animals, in proportion as they approach man biologically.

We must distinguish two things: value and the consciousness of value. They do not necessarily go together. Health is of value to a man; but if he is healthy he thinks little about his health, is hardly conscious of it at all. Similarly, the wise or just man is

not the man most conscious of his wisdom or justice. These values are often most clearly apparent to the observer, when their possessor has hardly any consciousness of them himself or may modestly but sincerely disclaim them. Now to the sub-human consciousness we can hardly ascribe any consciousness of value; but that will not be a reason for denying the presence of value. The value may still be there, though unrecognised by its possessor. "The animal," says Varisco[1], "coöperates without knowing it to develop life, to increase its value—that is, to render possible to other animals which will come after the realisation of higher values." But this does not make its values merely instrumental for that more developed life. Human values also are preparatory for a higher range of attainment. As Varisco says in the same connexion, "life develops itself towards an end which is not in the consciousness of any one individual subject, but which goes on realising itself—by means of the conscious aims of the individual subjects." The values which are prophetic of the future may be of intrinsic worth in their present realisation, even when realised on the level of the animal consciousness. The animal has a life of its own; it is for itself; and in this life and what furthers it value may lie. On the other hand, these values can only be such as we count low on the scale, and can involve little, if anything, more than biological preservation and its attendant feeling. For all those values which we count higher, consciousness is needed of a kind and degree which can hardly be attributed to the animals. They are not mere things, as Kant held they

[1] Varisco, *The Great Problems*, Engl. transl., p. 152.

were ; they have a life and values of their own ; but their life is from moment to moment, probably without clear recollection of the past or anticipation of the future. There is only the slightest evidence for the existence of 'free ideas' in their mental process ; there is no evidence for their possession of ideals ; and the possession of ideals is a condition of the production of the higher values. For all these higher values, consciousness is necessary—not a consciousness of possessing them, perhaps ; but a consciousness of the kind of objects and activities which contribute to them. Wisdom, for instance, does not involve, on the wise man's part, a consciousness that he is wise ; but it does involve a highly developed intelligence. The whole question of the existence of values in sub-human life must therefore be left without exact determination. They are on the line of potentiality, or of approximation, rather than of actual attainment. The individual centre of life, which is the ground of being-for-oneself, is there and makes the realisation of value a possibility, though the values actually realised may be subordinate and few : but they increase in number and worth as the life approaches the full characteristics of personality.

Human nature also displays many different grades of value and of capacity for the realisation of value. Different ages, different races, different social and intellectual conditions carry with them differences in value. The values appropriate to youth or middle life are not identical with those of childhood or old age ; primitive man finds values in activities and enjoyments which seem of little account in the estimate of an intellectual